Privatization of peacekeeping: UN's institutional capacity to control Private Military and Security Companies by Yigit, Huseyin
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-09
Privatization of peacekeeping: UN's institutional
capacity to control Private Military and Security Companies
Yigit, Huseyin














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING: UN’S 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO CONTROL PRIVATE 








Thesis Co-Advisors:  Anne Marie Baylouny 
                                                                      Sophal Ear 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING: UN’S 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO CONTROL PRIVATE MILITARY 
AND SECURITY COMPANIES 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Huseyin Yigit 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are perceived as a cost-effective alternative to the national troops 
contributed by member states to the UN peacekeeping operations. This thesis draws on the Thomas Bruneau’s three-
dimensional civil-military relations theory to answer the question: Can United Nations employ PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations to achieve UN goals more fully than national militaries?  
   
Analysis of the UN peacekeeping system reveals that although the UN peacekeeping system has undergone several 
reforms and developed capacities, current structure and institutional power of the UN has serious shortcomings to 
control PMSCs and ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The UN needs to develop a more detailed doctrine; create an 
overarching institutional coordination mechanism; and enhance its logistics capacity to effectively employ PMSCs. 








14. SUBJECT TERMS Private Military and Security Companies, United Nations, peacekeeping, 
privatization, institutional capacity, control, oversight, civil-military relations. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
99 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING: UN’S INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 




Captain, Turkish Army 
B.S., Kara Harp Okulu, 2003 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 



















Sophal Ear  




Mohammed M. Hafez  
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are perceived as a cost-effective 
alternative to the national troops contributed by member states to the UN peacekeeping 
operations. This thesis draws on the Thomas Bruneau’s three-dimensional civil-military 
relations theory to answer the question: Can United Nations employ PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations to achieve UN goals more fully than national militaries?    
Analysis of the UN peacekeeping system reveals that although the UN 
peacekeeping system has undergone several reforms and developed capacities, current 
structure and institutional power of the UN has serious shortcomings to control PMSCs 
and ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The UN needs to develop a more detailed 
doctrine; create an overarching institutional coordination mechanism; and enhance its 
logistics capacity to effectively employ PMSCs. Moreover, lose chain of command 
structure and vague exit strategies complicate the use of PMSCs in peacekeeping. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been involved in an 
increasing number of conflicts. In addition to the number of peace operations, the type of 
missions mandated changed as well—from interstate to intrastate. As stated in the 
Brahimi report, “United Nations operations did not deploy into post-conflict situations, 
but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a 
secure local environment, while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-
sustaining. Such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making 
peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.”1 Although the UN did not prove to 
be a good war-maker,2 many analysts accept that strong third-party involvement is 
needed both to ensure and further the consent of disputants, and to create a security 
environment necessary to further the peace process.3 Traditionally, the UN relies on 
troops drawn from member states on an ad-hoc case-base structure.4 However, post-Cold 
War security perceptions revealed the reluctance of major powers to become involved in 
the conflicts that were out of their interest.5 Thus, peacekeeping forces have been drawn 
                                                
1. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report) 
(S/2000/809-A/55/305), August 21, 2000.  
2. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 5. 
3. Richard Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73, no.6 
(November/December 1994): 31; Virgina Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ 
Choices after Civil War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 80.  
4. Doug Brooks, and Gaurav Laroia, “Privatized Peacekeeping,” National Interest 80 (Summer 2005): 
121; Oldrich Bures, “Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (2005): 541; Christopher Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping and the International Private 
Military and Security Industry,” International Peacekeeping 18, no.2 (2011): 198; Herbert M. Howe, 
“Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 36, no.2 (1998): 70.  
5. Damian Lilly, “Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities,” in Disarmament Forum, 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, no. 3 (2006): 54; Doug Brooks, “Messiahs or 
Mercenaries? the Future of International Private Military Services,”  International Peacekeeping, 7, no.4 
(2000): 134; David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy, 112 (Fall 1998): 70; Steven Brayton, 
“Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping,” Journal of International Affairs 
55, no.2 (Spring 2002): 304; Kevin O’Brien, “Military-advisory Groups and African Security: Privatized 
Peacekeeping?,” International Peacekeeping 5, no.3 (1998): 98; Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping,” 197. 
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from third-world countries without sufficient resources or capabilities.6 At the same time, 
post-Cold War era reductions in armies created a pool of experienced, retired, military 
personnel, which nourished the emergence of a private military and security sector,7 and 
provided services that were traditionally perceived to belong to the national militaries. 
The rise of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the wide range of 
services they provided, raised the question of possible use of PMSCs in UN peace 
operations, instead of national troops. This thesis will ask the question: Can the United 
Nations employ private military and security companies in peacekeeping operations to 
achieve UN goals more fully than national militaries? To answer this question, this thesis 
will analyze the institutional capacity of the UN to control PMSCs. This focus contrasts 
with the dominant literature, which focuses on the moral or legal problems related to 
PMSCs. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Failed states are dangerous not only to their people for whom they cannot or do 
not provide security, but are also a threat to collective security, since the power vacuum 
they create can harbor or flourish illegal entities.8 Thus, the UN’s involvement in 
intrastate conflicts is inevitable and will be so. Furthermore, though UN attempts aim to 
restore peace, military force requirement is inseparable from peacebuilding efforts since 
creating a secure environment is the preliminary condition to fulfill other tasks (justice 
and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and reconciliation) 
                                                
6. The top ten troop contributing countries are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Nepal, Jordan, Egypt, and Ghana. United Nations, “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN 
Operations,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jan13_2.pdf; Scot Fitzsimmons, “Dogs 
of Peace: A Potential Role for Private Military Companies in Peace Implementation,” Journal of Military 
and Strategic Studies, 8, no.1 (Fall 2005): 3–4; Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping,” 197.  
7. Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries?,” 130; P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53; Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping,” 
197; O’Brien, “Military-advisory Groups,” 81; Brayton, “Outsourcing War,” 309; Bures, “Private Military 
Companies,” 541; Howe, “Private Security Forces,” 70; Fitzsimmons, “Dogs of Peace,” 3. 
8. John J. Hamre, and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Towards Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no.4 (2002): 85–86; Robert Rotberg, “The New Nature of the Nation-State Failure,” in 
Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. O’Neil, Patrick H. and Ronald Rogowski (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2010). 
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during post-conflict reconstruction.9 However, the incapability and unsuccessful record 
of national troops of UN member states undermine the trust in UN peace operations. 
Furthermore, financial costs of peace operations have exceeded well over the 
expectations and capacities of UN members.10 Any improvement in UN peace operations 
will be beneficial to three groups. First, the people who suffer from intrastate conflicts 
will have better chances to overcome the consequences of war. Second, UN members 
will be more willing to participate in UN operations when possible risks and costs are 
more bearable politically and financially. Third, the UN itself is the beneficiary of 
improved peacekeeping alternatives. Since the UN is not an institution originally 
designed to execute peace operations, cost-effective and successful options will improve 
its capabilities. In this context, the question of PMSC use in UN peace operations is a 
pertinent alternative to national troops. Since it is the leading power in the international 
affairs, U.S. practice, the privatization of services traditionally perceived belong to 
national militaries, continues to affect other nations. Also, PMSCs openly defend their 
potential of better performance than traditional peacekeepers, and will do so with their 
corporate structures and legal connections to the governments. Thus, the UN’s potential 
ability to use PMSCs in peace operations efforts needs to be assessed. 
Although the UN has hired PMSCs for a long time, relation of the UN with the 
PMSCs has been on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, bound with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and many Conventions concerned 
with the human rights and related issues, on the other hand, facing the challenges of 
political constraints to meet the necessities of collective security, UN has developed “a 
particularly opaque practice”11 concerning the use of PMSCs. As Secretary General 
states in his report to the General Assembly, UN has appealed to PMSCs as a last resort 
when there is not any other opportunity to provide security. However, because of the lack 
                                                
9. Hamre and Sullivan, “Towards Postconflict Reconstruction,” 91. 
10. Although a $7.33 billion budget was approved for the period from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013, 
outstanding contributions to peacekeeping is $3.34 billion as of 31 January 2013. United Nations, 
“Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.  
11. Åse Gilje Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies,” 
DCAF, SSR Papers 3 (2011): 64. 
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of general principles to hire PMSCs and overarching institutional capacity to oversee all 
PMSC activities UN has hired PMSCs with bad reputation and past misconduct, which 
consequently undermines the UN’s legitimacy. Thus, the UN’s ability to employ PMSCs 
should be assessed to reveal the needs for further institutional developments. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Peacekeeping is a practical innovation of Cold War UN to perform the functions 
of the crippled Security Council because of great power confrontation, which precluded 
the collective security provisions of UN Charter. Despite the lack of any guiding 
document, policy, or past experience, peacekeeping did well during Cold War and was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 1988. However, the end of Cold War marked the dramatic 
surge of the demand for UN involvement in conflicts and ambitious Security Council 
mandates due to the increased intrastate conflicts in the absence of superpower support 
and Soviet Union’s increased cooperation in Security Council.  
In total, the UN has launched sixty-seven peace operations, thirteen of which 
deployed between 1948 and 1988. For eleven years after 1988,the deployment of 40 of 
the UN peace operations occurred. However, along with the increased number, conflicts 
also changed from interstate to intrastate wars, which challenged the traditional 
peacekeeping principles. Contrary to the traditional peacekeeping principles, the 
changing nature of the conflict imposed the following new challenges for the UN: lack of 
consent of the fighting parties; absence of a truce and an ongoing armed conflict; and 
weak, if any, governmental capacity. Changes in the number and nature of the conflicts 
revealed the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping system, and the international 
community started to lay the blame of humanitarian disasters of the 1990s on UN. This 
occurred only a few years after the UN peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
1988. Because of the political constraints both to pass a Security Council resolution, and 
to gather troops from member states on a consent basis, the reaction of the UN to crises 
began to slow down. Additionally, as troops were intentionally not drawn from great 
powers, participating troops from impartial states proved to be inadequately trained and 
ill equipped. Finally, and most importantly, the UN’s overall organizational structure 
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proved to be incapable of planning and executing peace operations. Thus, the UN started 
to question its peacekeeping function and organization since the 1990s.  
The literature on the possible use of PMSCs in UN peace operations focused 
mostly on the advantages that the UN benefitted from this outsourcing, or the challenges 
that PMSCs would produce. Some advantages of PMSCs included “faster, cheaper, 
better:” Faster because of the lack of political constrains that make gathering troops a 
challenge for the Secretary-General in case a mission is mandated, and especially in 
situations where many lives are at stake; better because PMSCs employ personnel with a 
military background mostly in western militaries, which is an exception for UN troops, 
since troops are mostly drawn from third world countries, and continuity in the 
organization increases the experience, which is the chronic problem for the UN’s ad-hoc 
peace organizations with continuously rotating national troops; and cheaper because 
PMSCs are private businesses in open market, and competition forces them to decrease 
costs. On the other hand, opponents for the PMSC use in peace operations points to the 
legal and normative problems related to them. First, PMSCs are not seen differently from 
mercenaries, which are deprived of the rights of combatants by the Geneva Convention 
and banned by the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries. Second, there are no proper international or national regulations 
to hold PMSCs accountable for their misconduct. Third, as private entities holding 
military assets, PMSCs contradict the idea of sovereignty that assigns the legitimate use 
of force solely to the states. 
Civil-military relations theory points out the institutional requirements to control 
PMSC activities and ensure effectiveness. This thesis will use Thomas Bruneau’s three-
dimensional civil-military relations (CMR) framework to assess the institutional capacity 
of the UN to employ PMSCs. Bruneau emphasizes the need for institutional mechanisms 
to properly employ and control PMSCs. In addition to the classic requirement of control, 
Bruneau adds effectiveness and efficiency as fundamental requirements of CMR to 
understand how well and at what cost security instruments do their job.12 Effectiveness 
                                                
12. Thomas Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 31. 
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and efficiency dimensions of Bruneau’s framework is especially important for the UN 
system, because the UN peacekeeping is dependent on scarce resources provided by the 
international community, whose further contribution is affected by success stories. 
The main argument of this thesis is that the use of PMSCs in peace operations 
requires institutional mechanisms to control them and ensure effectiveness and 
efficiency. However, the UN peacekeeping system has several institutional shortcomings. 
Peacekeeping is a UN function that had not been foreseen in the UN Charter. The 
international community and the UN improvised the provisions of the Charter  
(Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and Chapter VII, Forceful Actions against 
Breaches of Peace) and invented peacekeeping to supplement the collective security 
system, which was crippled during the Cold War. Thus, there was not a peacekeeping 
structure within the UN. Peacekeeping operations have been executed on ad hoc bases 
depending on the type and individual aspects of the each conflict. Although in time, 
especially after 1990s, the UN has reviewed and reformed its peacekeeping system to 
enhance its capabilities; the current structure of the UN peacekeeping system is not 
institutionalized enough to assert control and authority on PMSCs in peacekeeping 
operations—based on the civil-military relations theory. The focus of the UN capabilities 
is to achieve coordination among the actors participating in peace operations. Although 
peacekeeping operations are executed under the legal authority of the UN, a full 
operational command does not exist. Rather, the UN authorities facilitate a coordination 
process by persuasion and political compromise. 
C. LITERATURE ON PMSCS 
There is little theoretical research on the use of PMSCs in UN peacekeeping. The 
debate is largely about the advantages that outsourcing will provide to the UN and the 
problems surrounding the PMSCs, mainly normative objections concerning the analogies 
between PMSCs and historically condemned mercenaries. The most obvious advantage 
of outsourcing peacekeeping functions of the UN is cost effectiveness. In consistency 
with the idea of privatization, PMSCs are supposed to be an efficient solution to the 
skyrocketed peacekeeping budgets. Moreover, since PMSCs are not constrained by 
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political debates, they are able to deploy faster than the traditional troops. Since present 
practice is voluntary contribution of personnel to peacekeeping, new missions may suffer 
a timeliness problem due to long-lasting political processes. Finally, PMSCs are 
supposed to offer more effective capabilities since they employ from a pool of 
experienced personnel and employ them continuously. Traditional peacekeeping troops 
are criticized due to their ad hoc structures, inadequate training, and equipment. 
However, opponents of PMSCs use in peacekeeping emphasize the ambiguities 
surrounding PMSCs. First, PMSCs are not clearly distinct from mercenaries, which have 
been seen a source of conflict by international community. Both PMSCs and mercenaries 
are profit-driven actors and foreign to the conflict in which they participate directly. 
Second, PMSCs contradict the idea of sovereignty, which attributes the legitimate use of 
physical force to the state. Third, there are not enough international regulations to hold 
PMSCs accountable for their misconduct. UN relies on national regulations for traditional 
military personnel. However, other than ending contract there are not clear legal 
provisions for PMSCs. Additionally, PMSCs are secretive about their operations since 
they operate in open market. Finally, since PMSCs are profit driven business entities, 
they may have an interest in the continuation of conflict. 
1. Clarifying Definitions: Mercenary or PMSC 
The few legal documents that discuss private military and security companies or 
mercenaries, mention them interchangeably. The report of the Working Group on the Use 
of Mercenaries, as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the 
Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, examines activities of private military and 
security companies, and proposes new regulations.13 Similarly, the British government’s 
Green Paper (Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation) starts to find a proper 
definition for private military and security companies by defining the term mercenary.14  
                                                
13. United Nations, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (A/HRC/15/25) 
July 2, 2010. 
14. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 
(Green Paper), HC 577 (London: HMSO, 2002), 6. 
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There are only three international documents related to mercenaries. Article 47 of 
the First Additional Protocol of 1997 to the Geneva Conventions is the most well-known 
regulation, which deprives the mercenaries of the rights of combatants, and defines a 
mercenary as any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
ranks, and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict, nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State that is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces.15 
Regarding this definition’s narrowness, the Green Paper sees it unworkable 
because of the difficulty to prove motivation. Also, as was in the case of Sandline 
International’s 1997 contract with Papua New Guinea, employees of an international 
company can be defined as the member of the armed forces. Additionally, these foreign 
warriors can attain citizenship to avoid being classified as mercenaries.16 
The Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the Elimination 
of Mercenarism in Africa is another attempt to define mercenary activity, though 
narrowly again. Expressing OAU members’ hope for new international rules for making 
mercenarism an international crime, the OAU Convention defines mercenary activity, in 
                                                
15. Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, International 
Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument.  
16. Green Paper, 9. 
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addition to the definition of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, as in the 
following. 
“The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group, or association, 
representative of a State or the State itself, who with the aim of opposing by armed 
violence, a process of self-determination, stability, or the territorial integrity of another 
State, practices any of the following acts: 
a) Shelters, organizes, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports, or in 
any manner employs, bands of mercenaries; 
b) Enlists, enrolls or tries to enroll in the said bands; 
c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any 
territory under its jurisdiction, or in any place under its control, or affords facilities for 
transit, transport, or other operations of the above mentioned forces.”17 
In addition to OAU’s Convention, in 1989, the UN accepted the International 
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. 
Similar to OAU’s Convention, the UN’s Convention further defines mercenary activity 
as: “(1) overthrowing a Government, or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of 
a State; or (2) undermining the territorial integrity of a State.”18 Although these two 
conventions try to clarify the blurry definition of mercenarism, they do not cover the acts 
of private military and security companies. 
The main reason for mentioning mercenaries and PMSCs successively is their 
similarities in the way that PMSCs are also foreign to the conflict, seek their own profit, 
and participate directly in combat.19 However, there are also substantial differences 
between mercenaries and PMSCs. In contrast to freelance mercenaries, which serve for 
                                                
17. Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Libreville,  July 3, 1977, 
International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents, International Committee of the Red Cross, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/485?OpenDocument.  
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the highest payer,20 PMSCs pose a corporate structure, operate according to 
internationally accepted business contracts, avoid engaging with internationally 
unrecognized governments or entities, and openly market their services.21 Peter Singer 
asserts that mercenaries and PMSCs are different due to the corporatization of the latter. 
PMSCs contain: prior corporate structures; pursue business profit; operate in open market 
as legal entities; provide a wider range of services; recruit personnel through public 
application processes; and finally, have business linkages to greater conglomerates. To 
the contrary, mercenaries act in temporary and ad-hoc groupings, appreciate only cash, 
hide from the law, focus on combat services, assign through opaque processes to avoid 
legal prosecution, and have no business ties to a greater organization.22 
Contrary to the general perception of PMSCs as the evolved or disguised version 
of mercenaries, some scholars assert their substantial difference from mercenaries by 
historical examples. Tracking back to the 1960s, Kevin O’Brien describes SAS (Special 
Air Service, founded by David Stirling) and its successors (WatchGuard in 1967, Kulinda 
Security Ltd. 1970s, KAS Enterprises 1986) as the pioneers of modern PMSCs.23 
Moreover, Deborah Avant and P. W. Singer discuss similarities between modern PMSCs 
and military companies of the late Middle Ages.24  
In Corporate Warriors, P.W. Singer infers that four historical patterns contributed 
to the rise of private militaries. First is a change in warfare that increases the demand for 
hired troops. Second is mass demobilization in some parts of the world that fuels the flow 
of experienced soldiers to other parts of the world. Third, private militaries seek 
opportunities in the areas of weak governance. Finally, links between private militaries 
and business ventures.25  In parallel with these patterns, analysts relate the flourishing of 
PMSCs with: (1) the military pool of experienced soldiers due to reductions in the armies 
                                                
20. Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries?”131; O’Brien, “Military-Advisory Groups,” 81.  
21. Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” 69; Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries?,” 130. 
22. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 43–7. 
23. O’Brien, “Military-Advisory Groups,” 60. 
24. Avant, “Mercenaries,” 20; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 19–26. 
25. Ibid., 39. 
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after Cold War; (2) post-Cold War security perceptions of major powers, which makes 
them reluctant to support their past allies in weak states, and an increase in intrastate 
conflicts; (3) change in warfare from Cold War conventional scenarios to low-intensity 
civil wars; and (4) economic globalization that offers “high profits from investments in 
natural resource extraction operations in less developed countries.”26 
2. Classification of PMSCs 
There is confusion about how to classify PMSCs. Most of the definitions focus on 
the functions that PMSCs provide.  
Bruneau cites the classification of U.S. federal agencies: (1) Static security for 
fixed or static sites; (2) Convoy security; (3) Security escort for travelling individuals; (4) 
Personal security for high-ranking individuals.27  
On the other hand, Singer uses “Tip-of-the-Spear Typology,” which classifies 
PMSCs with regards to their closeness to the front line where actual fighting occurs. 
According to this typology, Singer separates PMSC industry into three categories:  
(1) Military Provider Firms,  
(2) Military Consultant Firms, and  
(3) Military Support Firms.28  
Military Provider Firms focus on the tactical environment and provide their 
customers implementation and command capacities in actual fighting.29 Military 
Consultant Firms provide advisory and training services without any engagement in 
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fighting.30 Singer defines Military Support Firms as firms specialized in secondary tasks 
out of core combat missions and providing non-lethal aid and support.  
Deborah Avant makes another tip of the spear classification. However, she 
classifies contracts not firms since a firm can easily move from one type of service to 
another. Avant classifies contracts first into two as military and police functions, and 
separates them with regards to their distance from front line: 
Military Functions:  
(1) Armed Operational Support,  
(2) Unarmed Operational Support on the Battlefield,  
(3) Unarmed Military Advice and Training,  
(4) Logistical Support; 
Police Functions:  
(1) Armed Site Security,  
(2) Unarmed Site Security,  
(3) Police Advice and Training,  
(4) Crime Prevention,  
(5) Intelligence.31 
Deschamps classifies PMSC functions according to “Combat Art” concept. Using 
the illustration of a sword master fighting with two blades, Deschamps classifies PMSCs 
according to the legality of their functions. Legally functioning firms are (1) Military 
Providers, (2) Military Consulting, (3) Intelligence Gathering & Counter Intelligence, and 
(4) Military Support. Undercover firms are (1) Military Undercover Ops providers, (2) 
Psy Ops providers, and (3) Military Covert Ops Support providers. Although proper 
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regulation is still not in place for monitoring legal functions, Deschamps asserts that 
undercover functions are difficult of impossible to regulate and monitor.32 
British Government’s Green Paper offers another classification:  
(1) Combat and Operational Support,  
(2) Military Advice and Training,  
(3) Arms Procurement,  
(4) Intelligence Gathering, 
(5) Security and Crime Prevention Services,  
(6) Logistical Support. 
The only international document—however not binding—that is directly related 
to the use of private military and security companies, is the Montreux Document, which 
is “a text containing rules and good practices relating to private military and security 
companies operating in armed conflict.”33 Montreux document’s definition for PMSCs 
and classification of them reflects the irresoluteness of the industry itself about the 
functions of the PMSCs. In the document, PMSCs are described as “private business 
entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe 
themselves.” Their services are described as: “armed guarding and protection of persons 
and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of 
weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to, or training of, local forces and 
security personnel.”34  
3. Problems of UN Peace Operations and PMSC Option 
Along with the increase in previously discussed civil conflicts, the UN has 
become involved in an increasing number of civil conflicts; however, its success record 
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varies. The Brahimi Report was conducted to review the peacekeeping system and 
provide recommendations to overcome shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping system. 
Although it accepts the shortcomings of relying only on conventional forces, the Brahimi 
Report asserts that “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental 
ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.”35 
Among the report’s recommendations “designed to remedy a serious problem,”36 the 
ones related to improve military capacity are:  
(1) The United Nations should define “rapid and effective deployment capacities; 
(2) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission 
leaders, the entire leadership should participate in the mission planning, and the 
secretariat should provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance;  
(3) Member States should be encouraged to form several coherent brigade-size 
forces ready for effective deployment; 
(4) The Secretariat should send a team to confirm the preparedness of each 
potential troop contributor on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to 
deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy; 
(5) The Panel recommends that a revolving “on-call list” of about 100 military 
officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of 
DPKO planners.37 
Furthermore, the cost of peacekeeping for the fiscal year 2012–2013 is $7.33 
billion,38 not including equipment reimbursements, which is approximately $3 billion.39 
Parallel to the report recommendations, shortcomings of UN peacekeeping operations are 
summarized as a “lack of common weaponry, compatible communications systems, 
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similar operational experiences and doctrine, and sometimes shared goals.”40 Due to the 
political processes needed to pass mandates for peace missions, and more importantly, 
convincing the troops, contributions prolong the reaction time of UN to a conflict.41   
4. Advantages of PMSCs 
Reasons for the recommendation of PMSCs, often match the shortcomings and 
problems of UN peace operations. Brooks and Laroia summarize the advantages of 
PMSCs as “faster, cheaper, better.”42 The cost-effectiveness and rapid deployment 
capacity is the core of the privatization of peace operations.43  
The most important reason for offering PMSCs as a peacekeeping option is their 
independence from political constraints that surround the decisions of UN members when 
contributing troops to conflict areas, and the scarcity of public reaction during PMSC 
casualties.44 Timely deployment is a central feature for success in peacekeeping, since it 
reveals the commitment of the international community to the conflict resolution. As UN 
fails to deploy troops in conflict regions in time, warring factions, consent of which 
enables the deployment of peacekeeping troops and opens a window for success, may 
renege from their commitment to the peace. The missions in Namibia, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and East Timor all suffered from slow deployment. 
Moreover, prolonged deployment process may exacerbate the fighting as the warring 
factions would want to size more territory before the deployment of UN troops. There are 
two reasons for slow action. First, UN bureaucracy is inadequate for planning and 
supplying a fast deployment. Second, the UN is dependent on the voluntary personnel 
contribution of member states; however, this is frequently not forthcoming and is time 
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consuming, due to political debates.45 Especially, politicians are reluctant to send troops 
into risky regions to avoid the domestic reaction for casualties. On the other hand, 
PMSCs, free from the approval of a political actor, offer a ready force supply for UN. 
Additionally, public opinion is less reactive in case of a PMSC casualty than military 
losses.   
The central theme of the privatization of peacekeeping is the association of 
private firms with cost-effectiveness and efficiency.46 Since PMSCs operate in open 
market, they have to minimize their cost to be competitive. Doug Brooks portrays this by 
comparing costs of the involvement of the Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, and the 
costs of the UN’s presence afterwards. Executive Outcomes, hired by the Sierra Leone 
government to fight the rebels in 1995–1996, cost less than $40 million. Whereas, the 
total cost of subsequent UN peacekeeping operations between 1999 and 2006 was $2.8 
billion, almost $40 million monthly.47 However, there is not an account of cost-
effectiveness during the prolonged presence of a PMSC, which is a normal situation for 
UN peacekeeping missions.    
Traditionally, PMSCs have better trained and experienced personnel than UN 
troops,48 mainly because PMSCs employ their personnel from a pool of experienced 
retired military personnel, and from Western armies. The UN relies on military personnel 
from non-aligned countries to maintain an impartial objective toward the conflict. Major 
Powers are intentionally excluded from peacekeeping troops; however, this inclination 
toward neutral states militaries, which are mostly weak militarily, results in incapable and 
under-equipped troops. Moreover, the UN does not have a standing military force; so 
peacekeeping missions consist of ad hoc military components rotating their personnel 
periodically. Peacekeeping troops suffer from the lack of past experience. Contrary to the 
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ad hoc structures of UN peacekeeping troops, PMSCs’ call lists provide a consistency 
and a mutual past experience.  
Furthermore, since PMSCs are not bound to political constraints of national 
governments, nor do they act according to their contracts, they are more willing to 
intervene in conflicts and use force than national troops.49 The UN peacekeeping 
missions suffer from the loose command and control. Though UN peacekeeping missions 
operate under the legal command of Secretary-General, and unity of command is the 
basic requirement of a military organization, national troops participating in UN 
peacekeeping refer to their national governments, and seek their approval, in serious 
circumstances involving threat or use of force.50 However, there are two reasons that 
assume PMSCs are more willing to use force. First, they are bound with their contract 
and its fulfillment, and in a case that requires coercive action, PMSCs are supposed to be 
more willing to use force to fulfill their contracts. Second, PMSCs are foreign to conflict 
that free them from the political consequences of their action. However, although 
willingness to use force is an effective military alternative, it is not consistent with the 
principles of peacekeeping; consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force 
except self-defense. 
5. Concerns about PMSCs 
There are also many concerns about the PMSCs. Most often cited is their 
accountability. Contrary to the accountability of national governments for the 
wrongdoings of their troops in any peace mission, there is no one accountable for the 
possible misconduct of PMSCs.51 Accountability requires transparency; however, 
PMSCs are secretive about their operations. Bruneau asserts several problems in 
gathering reliable information about the operation of PMSCs. First, contractors are free 
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from the transparency required of governmental agencies. National troops in 
peacekeeping are accountable to their governments in many ways. However, PMSCs are 
accountable only to their shareholders. Second, despite their wide range of operation 
areas, there is no centralized effort to keep track of PMSCs. Third; each contractor’s 
operation area is so broad, since a single contractor may operate in several countries. 
Fourth, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dramatically increased the use of contractors, 
which makes keeping track more difficult. Finally, contractors themselves are highly 
secretive because of their competitive nature.52 
Additionally, Privatization of peacekeeping raises concerns about the profit-
making nature of PMSCs. Since PMSCs earn from conflicts, they have a potential 
interest in the ongoing of conflict.53 This concern is essentially important in 
peacekeeping. Since it is hard to define the spoilers during a problematic peace process, 
adding a private actor seeking to maximize its profit from conflict will most probably 
increase the complexity of conflict resolution process.  
Furthermore, PMSCs’ relations with their home governments and Multinational 
Corporations (MNC) may raise doubts about a new type of colonialism. First, PMSCs are 
mostly based in powerful western countries, and there are implicit links between PMSCs 
and their home governments that governments use PMSCs as foreign policy proxies. For 
example, MPRI’s top cadre almost completely consists of retired high-ranking U.S. 
military personnel and company is specialized in services required by U.S. government. 
Second, MNCs constantly use PMSCs to secure their natural resource operations in 
unstable regions where host government cannot provide order. However, MNCs 
controlling both resources of a government and an effective security instrument gains 
powerful leverage over the host government, which consequently presents the argument 
of neocolonialism operating under the banner of liberal market policies.54 
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Finally, private force contradicts with the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the 
notion that attributes the monopoly of coercive power within a country to the state. The 
main idea behind sovereignty is to obtain and sustain a domestic order. However, PMSCs 
holding military capacities challenges the idea of sovereignty. This contradiction has 
important reflections in UN peacekeeping. First, peacekeeping missions deployed in 
failing states, especially after Cold War. A state fails when it cannot provide the security 
and order to its population and then loses its legitimacy. Sovereignty in case of state 
failure is essential both for the domestic legitimacy and international recognition of a 
government. However, employing PMSCs in peacekeeping will adversely affect the very 
government that peacekeeping is deployed to strengthen or restore. Brayton’s expression 
is meaningful in failed states: “If there are organizations within a state’s boundaries 
capable of providing the citizens more protection than the state itself, the state becomes at 
best an annex of such organizations, and individual citizens learn quickly where to place 
their loyalty.”55  
Although the UN intervention also seems as an infringement of the national 
sovereignty, the UN and its member states recognize the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
approach. Written in 2000 by an International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty backed by Canadian government, R2P re-defines the states’ sovereignty as a 
responsibility to protect their population, rather than being solely the monopoly of use of 
physical force. In the 2005 World Summit, the international community recognized the 
idea of R2P as: “(1) responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and from their incitement; (2) 
the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting these 
obligations; and (3) the responsibility of the member states to respond in a timely manner 
when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.”56 Thus, R2P approach 
justifies and legitimizes the UN peacekeeping as a state responsibility and is not 
considered as a violation of sovereignty rights. 
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6. Driving Reasons for Privatization 
Despite these negative concerns about PMSCs, the UN has been using them for 
many years. In his report to the General Assembly, Secretary General acknowledged that 
the UN has used PMSCs as a last resort, in the absence of any other means, only to 
protect personnel and facilities.57 The UN used a PMSC in Angola to provide local 
guards, as well as in a Kinshasa-Congo to provide security for the UN offices. Likewise, 
the UN employed PMSCs for many services, including intelligence information, satellite 
communications and imaging, logistical support, and helicopter transportation.58 
The use of PMSCs by the major powers provides additional incentives to privatize 
peacekeeping. Thomas Bruneau explains the reasons for increasing use of PMSCs. 
Although Bruneau examined PMSCs in a national context, PMSCs and their 
appropriateness in U.S. civil-military relations, his findings shed light to possible 
problems of PMSC use in peacekeeping. Bruneau counts several important driving 
reasons for contracting services traditionally belonging to the military. These reasons are 
in parallel with the proposals for PMSC use in peacekeeping, though not in Bruneau’s 
order. First, the post-Cold War reduction in the U.S. army created a shortage in military 
personnel; however, Global War on Terrorism and other contingencies increased military 
requirements. Second, the U.S. government has employed policies to contract services 
that are not inherently governmental, and congruent with these policies, the DoD started 
to outsource and privatize some of its traditional functions. Finally, the military could not 
provide protection to non-DoD personnel.59  
7. How to Control PMSCs 
Despite the normative and legal contradictions, many states, Multi-National 
Corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Inter-Governmental Organizations 
including UN have hired PMSCs. A Civil Military Relations (CMR) approach to the use 
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of PMSCs, seeing them as legal business enterprises providing alternative security 
services, asserts that the real challenge is the institutional capacity of the contractor to 
ensure the PMSCs proper functioning. Although traditionally the CMR examines the 
relations of civil governments and militaries, these research indicate the necessity to 
include PMSCs in the realm of CMR since PMSCs offer services that are not considered 
inherently governmental anymore and are “indispensable elements of CMR.”60 This 
research emphasizes the institutional capacities of states to monitor and control PMSCs 
as contracting principals. Differentiating between strong and weak states, Dumlupinar 
sees weak states as more vulnerable to the challenges imposed by PMCs, since they 
mostly lack the required institutional capacities to control PMSCs. On the other hand, 
though strong states have the institutional capacity to solve problems, he points out the 
need for political will to do so.61 Dogru summarizes the institutional requirements to 
monitor and control PMSCs as:  
(1) developing a comprehensive doctrine,  
(2) creating an institutional memory,  
(3) creating an open, transparent, and competitive market,  
(4) strengthening interagency coordination mechanisms,  
(5) increasing the quality and quantity of contracting professional,  
(6) training commanders and clarifying authorities,  
(7) continuing to licensing system.62 
Based on New Institutionalism, Thomas Bruneau has developed a more 
comprehensive three-dimensional CMR approach that is applicable to the use PMSCs as 
well. Bruneau emphasizes the need for institutional capacity for properly functioning 
                                                
60. Nihat Dumlupinar, “Regulation of Private Military Companies in Iraq,” (Master’s Thesis, NPS, 
2010), 27, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_Dumlupinar.pdf. 
61. Ibid., 1. 
62. Ali Kemal Dogru, “Outsourcing, Managing, Supervising, and Regulating Private Military 
Companies in Contingency Operations,” (master’s thesis, NPS, 2010), 71–83, 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Sep/10Sep_Dogru.pdf. 
 22 
civil-military relations. Legal written procedures do not guarantee their implications; 
rather it is the institutional capacity that ensures the implication of rules. Bruneau cites 
following issues about institutions. First, institutions are defined as “the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity of political economy.”63 Second, there is a continuing interaction 
between institutions and the goals and motivations of the actors who created the 
institutions. As actors create and change institutions, institutions shape actors as well by 
creating and changing their motivations. Third, institution building and implementing is 
all about power, therefore institutional power relations are primary concern of both New 
Institutionalism and civil-military relations.64 Institutions have certain influences over 
organizations and actors: 
1. The Formative Impact on Actors: Actors’ motivations are shaped by 
internalized goals and procedures that are congruent with the institutional patterns.  
2. Congruent Preference Formation: Institutions provide predictability, regularity, 
stability, integration, discipline and cooperation. 
3. Economizing on Transaction Costs: Decreasing uncertainty, institutions 
increase efficiency of transactions and avoid conflicts. 
4. Frictionless Self-coordination: The environment created by institutional 
opportunities and incentives provides a spontaneous order. 
5. Continuity: By virtue of the instilled perceptions and goals and procedures, 
institutions can perpetuate themselves. However, the time span of their existence makes 
institutions immune to changes. Therefore, they can breed conservatism both because of 
their perceived rectitude, and because of the resistance from those who have power from 
institutions.65  
The concept of CMR asserted by Thomas Bruneau is a three dimensional 
approach. Though civilian control is a fundamental condition for CMR, it is not adequate. 
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As Bruneau stated “the challenge in contemporary world is not only to assert and 
maintain civilian control over the military but also to develop effective militaries, and 
other security forces, that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”66 
Therefore, in addition to classical concept of civilian authority, Bruneau’s approach 
conceptualized CMR in order to understand how well and at what cost militaries and 
other security instruments perform. CMR should encompass three dimensions: control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency. 
First, democratic civilian control dimension requires three elements: 1) it must be 
grounded in and exercised through institutions such as organic laws, civilian-led 
organizations with professional staffs, committees in the legislatures, and well-defined 
chain of authority; 2) control requires implementation of oversight through institutional 
mechanism to guarantee consistent performance of security and defense; and 3) control 
should be instilled in the institution through professional training.67 
Effectiveness dimension of the CMR have several requirements for 
conceptualization. First, expansion of the range of roles executed by security forces 
requires different goals to measure the effectiveness. This is especially important for UN 
peacekeeping missions, since uniformed personnel are assigned completely different 
tasks from traditional military. Second, military forces should be given adequate 
resources to implement their roles. Third, since most of the missions require the 
involvement of different services, jointness and interagency coordination should be 
strengthened. Coordination problems are an indispensable aspect of UN peacekeeping 
missions as a myriad of organizations (international financial institutions, regional 
organizations, individual UN Member States and coalitions, national development 
agencies, intergovernmental organizations outside UN structure and international non-
governmental organizations)68 are involved in peacekeeping, in addition to the several 
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UN bodies, agencies, and funds. Fourth, this dimension is complicated by the assessment 
of effectiveness in the context of deterrence.69 
“The third dimension...is efficiency in the use of resources to fulfill the assigned 
roles and missions.”70 Although even with a vast range of roles to assess it, efficiency is 
quite difficult, the first and foremost requirement of efficiency is a statement of its 
objectives.71 This is another problematic issue for a UN peacekeeping operation, along 
with the inability to measure the success of the peacekeeping mission. Since peace is hard 
to define, many scholars offer different measurements, such as durability of peace,72 
consistency of mandate,73 domestic stability,74 end of conflict,75 and limitation of armed 
conflict.76 
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II. WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING? 
The main goal of this chapter is to understand UN peacekeeping regarding:  what 
conditions promoted it; what experiences the UN has had; what types of UN 
peacekeeping operations exist; and what the principles of the UN peacekeeping are. 
Reason behind this analysis is to show that UN peacekeeping is the normative expansion 
of the idea of collective security. In addition to the legitimacy, peacekeeping is dependent 
on the multilateralism to justify intervention in the realm of sovereignty. Although 
PMSCs provide a cost-effective solution to ad hoc peacekeeping troops contributed by 
member states without adequate training and equipment, notion of peacekeeping as an 
international tool to sustain peace and security is dependent on the multilateral 
contribution of member states. Consent of the parties, the most important principle of 
peacekeeping, requires a delicate arrangement of peacekeeping troops to be effective 
when implement the goals of the mandate, and not threatening at the same time. 
Surrounded by many problems contradicting sovereignty and accountability, the PMSCs 
could not make success more likely than traditional UN peacekeeping troops. 
Since peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter as a conflict resolution 
method, peacekeeping was an improvisation of UN and international community to fill 
the gap of a defective collective security system. Dedicated to “save the succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war,” the UN was designed as a collective security 
institution. The UN Charter foresees two ways of conflict resolution: pacific settlement 
provisioned in Chapter VI; and forceful action against any breach of peace mentioned in 
Chapter VI. However, East-West tension in the Security Council during the Cold War 
precluded materialization of the Charter’s collective security provisions. Peacekeeping 
was invented as an impartial tool to restore peace. Thus, Dag Hammarskjold coined the 
term “Chapter Six and a Half” to emphasize the innovative nature of peacekeeping.77 
However, as the international environment and conflicts changed, peacekeeping has 
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evolved to adapt. The 1990s especially witnessed an increased demand in the UN role as 
a peacekeeper with a new wide range of missions.  
The first section of this chapter will analyze peacekeeping in a historical 
perspective to understand it better. Since peacekeeping is the result of international 
efforts for global peace and security, analysis will start with the origins of the UN. Since 
the UN is a universal organization based on the sovereign equality of states, its history 
goes back to Treaty of Westphalia, which introduced sovereign nation states as the main 
actor in international relations. The most important developments for the emergence of 
the international organization took place during 19th century. Increasing 
interconnectedness and the need for peaceful ways of conflict resolution pushed states to 
find new ways of overcoming disputes. Thus, 19th century witnessed the emergence of 
international concerts, conferences, and international public institutions. During the 
period from Westphalia to League of Nations, the tool that states used to ensure security 
and peace was balance of power—if one state gains overwhelming powers and becomes a 
threat, other states would unite and balance the powerful. As the most important 
predecessor of UN, the League of Nations introduced the idea of collective security—in 
case of a breach of peace and security all states would unite to stop the aggressor. Despite 
the potential strength of the idea of collective security—all for one, one for all—the 
League failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II because of the lack of mechanisms 
to ensure the proper practice of collective security. UN was established over the lessons 
learned with the League experience. The UN Charter accepted the idea of collective 
security and vested the Security Council the right to determine “the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.”78 These measures include 
“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”79 or “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
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restore international peace and security.” However, East West tensions of Cold War 
proved the weakness of collective security provisions of charter. Peacekeeping was 
introduced to fill the void of the crippled collective security system. 
In the second section, UN’s peacekeeping experience will be analyzed. This 
analysis shows that peacekeeping does not have a clear definition. UN defines it as “one 
of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the 
difficult path from conflict to peace.”80 As it was an innovation and had not been 
foreseen during the establishment of the UN, peacekeeping has been in a continuous 
development and adaptation to the environment in which it was employed. Although 
traditional peacekeeping, interposition of lightly armed forces between warring parties, 
proved effective in facilitating negotiated peace ending interstate wars, the changed 
nature of conflicts to intrastate civil wars with the end of Cold War compelled the UN 
peacekeeping system. In addition to major peacekeeping operations, this section will 
analyze the characteristics of a peacekeeping operation, its principles, and causal 
mechanisms that facilitate peace process. 
A. BEFORE THE UN 
As the UN is an international organization based on the sovereign equality of its 
member states, roots of the organization can be traced back to treaty of Westphalia 
(1648).81 Treaty of Westphalia laid the foundation of the current international system by 
promoting the sovereign state as the ultimate domestic power. Though the idea of 
sovereignty—state has the ultimate power within its territories—aimed to bring domestic 
stability and peace, it created an anarchical environment in the international relations, 
where each state sought ways to secure its own survival. Equality of states and the 
absence of an international ultimate authority was the very reason for the anarchical 
environment. States used balance of power—ad hoc and temporary alliances of states 
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against aggression—to ensure security. Additionally, a nascent international law—
international human rights, war crimes82—began to grow during this time. Although 
international regulations depended on the consent of the states to abide by, these 
developments set the first stage for the emergence of an international organization for 
peace and security. By the 19th century international regulations and Westphalian state 
system began to join.83  
1. Nineteenth Century Developments 
During 19th century, development of three strands of thinking and practice 
foreshadowed the creation of international organizations. First was recognizing the utility 
of multilateral diplomacy. After defeating Napoleon, the European states participated in 
the Concert of Europe (1815) to restructure Europe and its diplomatic practices.84 Under 
the Concert system, European leaders gathered thirty meetings between 1815 and 1878 to 
settle problems and achieve coordination. These meetings solidified some important 
practices: multilateral consultation, collective diplomacy, and special status for great 
powers. Concert system was the result of a growing sense of interdependence and 
community of interest, which was a vital prerequisite for modern international 
organizations.85 Second was the formation of public international unions. Established to 
overcome the problems stemming from expanding trade, communications, and 
technological innovation of the industrial revolution,86 these functional 
intergovernmental organizations contributed to security indirectly by entangling states in 
a web of social and economic cooperation strong enough to make war irrational.87 Some 
of these organizations were: Intergovernmental unions, such as the International 
Telegraphic Union (1865), and the Universal Postal Union (1874).88 Third development 
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that precipitated the environment for the international organization was the Hague 
system. In 1899 and 1907 in Hague, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened two 
conferences, which led to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, ad hoc international commissions of inquiry, and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. Held in the absence of a war, the Hague conferences contributed many 
innovations to the international relations: both small and non-European States were 
included in conferences turning a largely European state system into a truly international 
system, aspiring the universal membership that UN was to do decades later;89 multilateral 
diplomacy employed techniques, which became the permanent features of twentieth-
century organizations, such as the election of chairs, the organization of committees, and 
roll call votes; codification of international law.90 Though these developments were 
innovative and useful, they could not prevent World War I, and proved to be insufficient 
when national interests are at stake.  
2. The League of Nations 
League of Nations was the most important of all predecessors of the UN. 
Although it is obvious now in retrospect that the League was unsuccessful to prevent war, 
it provided the experiences and lessons for the establishment of UN. Established after 
World War I, League introduced the idea of collective security in international security. 
However, because of the lack of robust legal and institutional, the League of Nations 
experienced serious failures to sustain international peace. First, decision-making process 
crippled the organization to react to the breaches of peace. Unanimity was required in 
both Council and Assembly for decisions. As a reflection of strict idea of sovereignty, 
this requirement made the League act too little and too late.91 Second, member states had 
the right to refuse the League-sponsored activities. Because of this loose sanctioning 
mechanism, the League failed to prevent aggressions. Finally, the League could not 
materialize the universal membership since U.S. was not a member of the League; the 
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Soviet Union joined only in 1934; Japan left in 1931, and Italy in 1937; Germany joined 
in 1926 but left in 1933. Furthermore, Axis powers were initially excluded from the 
organization.92 With difficult decision-making process, League failed to act when Japan 
invaded Manchuria in 1931 and when French occupied Ruhr in 1923, and act too late and 
too little when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Most importantly, the League could not 
prevent World War II. 
3. Collective Security 
The main difference between collective security and balance of power, or 
collective defense, systems is the perception of peace and security. Alliances and 
collective defense arrangements are directed potential external aggressors. On the other 
hand, collective security accepts peace as indivisible93 and aims to counter any 
aggressions, even from within the members of the system, to the peace.94 The underlying 
assumption in collective security system is no state could attack another with the fear of 
retribution from all other governments.95 This system depends more on the voluntary 
participation and normative rules. Collective security norm requires states to put the 
general interests of the groups before their own immediate interests.96 Since collective 
security does not define a specific aggressor, it does not function continuously in 
peacetime; rather it is an emergency mechanism.97 
From a realistic point of view, a collective security system has many 
disadvantages. First, a collective security system fails as states fail to fulfill their 
commitments to the system. Realist theory assumes international systems are anarchic 
self-help systems, in which states pursue their own interests to survive. Thus, in the 
necessity of a collective action, some states may fail to honor their commitment to the 
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system. Second, a collective security system is too conservative since it favors status quo. 
Third, disseminating the responsibility of preparing for an aggression will undermine the 
power balance in case of the emergence of a troublesome state. Since collective security 
system assumes all states as the members of the same society and do not define any 
potential aggressor, in case of an aggression system would be caught unprepared. Fourth, 
states will not commit to the collective security since they may have already defined their 
friends and enemies. Finally, centralization requirement of a collective action contradicts 
with the idea of sovereignty.98 
On the other hand, constructivist ideational approach asserts that an 
institutionalized collective security system, all against one, provides more effective 
security than an unregulated self-help system. A collective security system—regulated 
balancing upon the notion of all against one—is more likely to prevent war and bring 
stability than the unregulated balancing of an anarchic system—each for his own. 
Constructivists recognize two advantages of collective security. First, collective security 
provides a more effective balancing against aggressors. When collective security works, 
it confronts the aggressor with an overwhelming power. Moreover, though practice of 
collective security depends on the commitment of the members, worst scenario of 
collective security system—all members’, other than those are directly threatened, 
defection from their commitment to the system—is equal to the best of the balancing 
under anarchy. Second advantage of a collective security system is the promotion of trust 
and cooperation among states. An institutionalized collective security system decreases 
the security dilemma and provides stability. In a stable environment states would focus 
more on absolute gains—realism asserts that relative gains matter in an insecure anarchic 
world—and devote more resources to welfare rather than ensuring survival. Moreover, 
confidence about the intentions of other states promotes cooperation. Finally, collective 
security institutions help to align the national interests with international stability. Since 
collective security system assumes all member states as the part of a society of nations, 
member states has reasonable trust to each other’s intentions on the rules of the system 
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and believe in the necessity of the system in resolving disputes. Thus, well working of the 
system and its continuity becomes a part of the legitimacy.99  
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UN 
The UN was established as an international collective security organization upon 
the experiences of the League of Nations failure at the end of World War II. In 1942, 26 
nations agreed upon the creation of international organization affirming the Atlantic 
Charter (14 August 1941), declared by the leaders of U.S. and UK. The UN Charter was 
drafted during two sets of meetings between August and October 1944, at Dumbarton 
Oaks, and was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945.100 There are certain differences 
between the UN and the League of Nations to avoid a similar failure. First, unanimity is 
not required for decision making in the Security Council, and permanent members of the 
Council have the right to veto a measure to assure the major powers that the organization 
will not work against them. Since the absence of major powers in the League was a 
central reason for the failure,101 the UN was designed to keep them in the game. The 
League’s Covenant did not include the right to veto. Additionally, decision process in the 
Security Council, which was the main reason for the League’s inertia or slowness, was 
designed to accelerate the procedure. Second, the UN Charter aimed to achieve the 
universal membership because it is a separate written document unlike the League’s 
Covenant, which was incorporated to the Versailles treaty. Thus, League did not entitle 
the Axis powers the right to join.  
1. Legal and Institutional Basis of UN Collective Security 
There are certain institutional and legal basics of the UN’s collective security 
system. UN consists of six main organs: “a General Assembly, a Security Council, an 
Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice 
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and a Secretariat.”102 Charter assigns the Security Council as primarily main organ “for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”103 Chapter VI of the Charter 
regulates the pacific settlement of disputes and gives the Security Council the right to 
“call upon the parties to settle their dispute”104 by peaceful means and to “investigate any 
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute.”105 Chapter VII of the Charter deals with the active measures that shall be taken 
with respect to aggression. According to the Chapter VII provisions, Security Council has 
the right to determine the existence of aggression106 and may decide to take measures 
“not involving the use of armed force”107 including “complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations,”108 or in case of inadequacy 
of these measure “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.”109 
The other central organ concerning the collective security is the General 
Assembly. Although Charter does not assign any right to the General Assembly directly 
to take action, “as the general debate arena where all members would be equally 
represented according to the a one-state/one-vote formula,”110 Assembly has the right to 
discuss anything related to the Charter and may discuss “the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles 
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make 
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recommendations”111 and “may call the attention of the Security Council to situations 
which are likely to endanger international peace and security.”112 In addition to the 
Charter provisions, General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace resolution in 
response to the dead lock in the Security Council concerning Korean War. Resolution 
stretched the responsibilities of the General Assembly and gave the authority to make 
recommendations for collective security measures if “Security Council, because of lack 
of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”113 
Finally, as the chief executive officer of the organization, Secretary-General plays 
a crucial instrumental role in dispute mediation. Though not frequently used, article 99 of 
the Charter assigns the Secretary-General the right to “bring to the attention of the 
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”114  
2. Collective Security Practice 
The UN has been, and is still is, the only international organization with universal 
membership. Compared to the League of Nations, it has served well as a central site for 
multilateral diplomacy and has saved the “succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war” for the time being. However, collective security measures have been problematic for 
the UN as well. Establishment of the UN coincided with the Cold War. Serious East-
West confrontation and ideological divide prevented UN respond to conflicts such as 
French, and then the U.S., intrusions in Vietnam (1947–74), Soviet interventions to 
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) to suppress anti-Communist movements.115 
Though veto power assured major power participation in the organization, it prevented 
action during Cold War. Since the inception of UN system, Security Council defined an 
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aggressor to the peace only twice: Korea (1950) and Iraq (1990). Indeed, Council’s 
reaction to North Korean invasion of South Korea was made possible by the absence of 
Soviet delegate as a boycott to the Taiwan’s representation in Council instead of China. 
Soviet’s return to the Council blocked further action, and General Assembly authorized 
much of the operation under Uniting for Peace resolution. Thus, Korean War presents an 
exception to the crippled UN collective security.116 Implementation of collective security 
in Iraqi war could be interpreted as an exception since it coincided with the end of Cold 
War, when Russia was eager to show its commitment to peace and cooperation, and the 
aggression was obvious without leaving any void for political discussion. 
C. PEACEKEEPING 
In the midst of a veto-crippled collective security system, peacekeeping was 
offered as solution to the conflicts that may endanger global peace. Though many 
scholars and individuals have offered definitions for peacekeeping, UN does not have a 
clear definition of peacekeeping. The Charter does not mention a method called 
peacekeeping. Even the operations executed by the UN do not match each other to infer 
what peacekeeping is. However, as the UN states peacekeeping is “one of the most 
effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from 
conflict to peace.”117 Peacekeeping is the improvisation of collective security. UN 
Charter defines two ways of aforementioned conflict resolution: Chapter VI pacific 
settlement and Chapter VII enforcement. Since the superpower tension in Security 
Council, supported by the veto power, precluded the practical implementation of 
collective security provisions of the Charter, an impartial effort was needed to prevent 
conflicts to grow and sustain peace. Inis L. Claude emphasizes this impartial legacy of 
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promote order by bringing the great powers into troubled situations. Henceforward, the 
task of the United Nations was to be defined as that of keeping great powers out of such 
situations.”118 
1. Traditional Peacekeeping 
According to the UN’s official view, first peacekeeping operation was United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)119 deployed in May 1948. UNTSO 
consisted of unarmed military observers whose primary mission was monitoring and 
reporting of a cease-fire.120 However, scholars classify UNTSO and following 
UNMOGIP (deployed in 1949 in Kashmir to monitor the movements of the Indian and 
Pakistani troops and investigate complaints)121 as observer missions. Observer missions 
were different from peacekeeping operations in a number of ways. First, personnel 
deployed in observer mission were not armed and small in numbers compared to the 
peacekeepers. Second, observer missions were not deployed to occupy a buffer zone.122 
Their mission was limited to monitoring the implementation of a mutually agreed cease-
fire agreement. Thus, observer missions executed “nurse like”123 roles, which were 
ineffective to resolve conflicts. 
However, many scholars start peacekeeping with the deployment of United 
Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF I) in 1956.124 UNEF I was the first attempt to 
overcome the malfunctioning collective security. Diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the 
problems emerged after the nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt. Israel, despite the 
presence of UNTSO in the region, invaded Egypt on October 29. Following Israel’s 
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invasion, Britain and France attacked Egypt to get the control of canal back. A Security 
Council resolution to stop the war was vetoed by Britain and France, proving the 
weakness of collective action. Any resolution biasing Britain and France was impossible 
since Soviet Union was in favor of Egypt. Deployment of another observation mission 
was pointless since the UNTSO was already in the region and had failed to prevent war. 
In the midst of political turmoil, General Assembly passed the resolution 997 calling for a 
cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and reopening of the Suez Canal. On November 4, 1956, 
the General Assembly passed the Resolution 998, which authorized “the Secretary-
General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent 
of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure 
and supervise the cessation of hostilities.”125 UNEF I experience provided the basis for 
the future peacekeeping missions. Most of the Cold War era peacekeeping missions 
included lightly armed peacekeepers deployed in a buffer zone between belligerents to 
prevent accidental renewal of fighting. These missions were lightly armed to use force as 
last resort for self-defense only. However, political will of international community 
provided the support for their mission. 
2. End of Cold War and New Typologies 
UN has deployed 68 peacekeeping operations to date, thirteen of which was 
deployed during Cold War. Traditional peacekeeping, dealing mostly with interstate 
wars, proved successful to help sustain the international peace, and UN peacekeeping was 
awarded Nobel Prize in 1988. However, not more than a few years later this success 
story, UN peacekeeping experienced severe criticism in failing to respond conflicts. End 
of Cold War marked a dramatic change in the context and the number of the conflicts that 
UN was demanded to involve. Security Council issued three times more authorization for 
peacekeeping operation between 1987 and 1994. The result was an unprecedented 
increase in peacekeeping troops and budget. Number of troops rose to more than seventy 
thousand from less than ten thousand, and peacekeeping budget skyrocketed from 320 
million dollar to 3.6 billion dollars reaching to about three times the regular UN 
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budget.126 The end of superpower struggle created a void that enabled the resurgence of 
nationalism, civil wars, and ethnic conflict. Moreover, this period created a new 
phenomenon called failed states, in which government institutions do not exist or 
function properly. The end of Cold War, beginning of which gave birth to peacekeeping, 
pushed peacekeeping evolve into a more complex and ambitious phase.  
a. Complex Peacekeeping 
Different from traditional peacekeeping, complex peacekeeping is 
deployed in civil conflicts where armed fighting has not stopped yet and all parties do not 
consent to the presence of the peacekeepers. In addition to the traditional interposition 
function, complex peacekeeping missions “facilitate the political process, protect 
civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and 
assist in restoring the rule of law.”127  
Because of the erosion of the traditional principles, peacekeeping 
operations witnessed dramatic failures. The lack of consent of the parties increased the 
risks that peacekeepers are exposed and decreased the political support of the troop 
contributing countries. In Somalia, twenty-four Pakistani troops were killed during a 
weapons storage inspection on June 5, 1993, and eighteen U.S. troops were killed on 
October 3, 1993, which consequently led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and failure of 
the operation.128 Additionally, lack of consent of one of the parties may lead to the 
erosion of impartiality of the mission. Since Aideed, one of the main belligerents in the 
Somalia civil war, did not consent to UN mission, peacekeeping troops became a party to 
the conflict, another reason for the failure. 
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b. Peacebuilding 
Another type of UN peace operation that became relevant in post-Cold 
War period was peacebuilding. Peacebuilding focused on building a long-term 
foundation for stable peace by eliminating the root causes of a conflict through the 
implementation of multidimensional peace agreements, and by strengthening national 
capacities to prevent lapsing or relapsing into conflict.129 In addition to peacekeepers 
executing traditional or complex military peacekeeping functions, peacebuilding missions 
included civilian personnel, both UN and humanitarian NGO, and executed a wider range 
of functions for a long-term peace, such as disarming belligerents, restoring rule of law, 
training and reforming security to advance protection of human rights, monitoring 
elections, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal 
and informal processes of political participation.130 
c. Peace Enforcement 
To respond to the humanitarian crisis emerging in failed states of post-
Cold War time, the UN employed a type of coercive peace operation, with similarities to 
a collective security action. Peace enforcement included the application of a range of 
coercive measures, including threat or use of force, to persuade belligerents of a cease-
fire. Main aim of an enforcement mission is to deter, dissuade, and deny fighting in a 
civil war. Since enforcement does not necessarily require the consent of the warring 
parties, the UN’s success record in enforcement has been contradictory. The UN 
operations in Somalia and former Yugoslavia have been criticized as failures since 
warring parties did not consent to peace agreements and operation could not prevent 
casualties, including peacekeepers themselves. 
3. Principles of Peacekeeping 
UN peacekeeping site specifies three basic principles of peacekeeping: consent of 
the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except self-defense and defense of the 
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mandate.131 Consent of the parties provides the operation both strength and a weakness. 
Consent makes peacekeeping more acceptable and reduces the risks for the troops, which 
would directly affect the commitment of troop contributing countries. On the other hand, 
consent could be withdrawn any time, which proves if one side decides to go to war 
peacekeepers have very little to do.132 Another principle of peacekeeping is impartiality. 
Different from a collective security operation in which an aggressor is defined, 
peacekeeping operations do not define an aggressor and act impartial between parties.133 
Moreover, impartiality affects the composition of the troops as well. Many peacekeeping 
forces are drawn from non-aligned states.134 However, impartiality has contradictions as 
well. Since peacekeeping operation needs the consent of the parties, peacekeepers may be 
reluctant to condemn any violations, which on the other hand undermine the credibility of 
the mission.135 Thus, peacekeepers have “to criticize, use pressure, mobilize international 
support, even in circumstances take forceful action when a party violated agreed 
arrangements,”136 without going beyond and taking sides. The final principle of 
peacekeeping is non-use of force except self-defense and defense of the mandate. 
Peacekeeping troops are designed to execute missions different than traditional military 
forces.137 Peacekeepers do not stop fighting between rival enemies. They achieve their 
influence from the diplomatic and political support of the international community.138 
Furthermore, though peacekeepers act as an interposition force between conflicting 
forces, they are not supposed to defend their territory in a traditional way. Finally, 
peacekeepers are usually lightly armed and have vehicles for transportation only, rather 
than those that might be used for attack.139 
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In addition to the established officially accepted principles of peacekeeping, there 
are certain conditions that affect the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. 
Continuing support of the Security Council is required not only in the beginning of an 
operation but also in the renewal and budget processes. Diminished Security Council 
support will put the operation back in the strategic priorities of international 
community.140 Another requirement for a successful peace operation is the mandate. 
Mandate of a peace operation defines its missions and sets goals. As the ultimate guiding 
document, mandate should be “clear, obtainable, and known to all parties.”141 A clear 
mandate should precisely present the purpose and the actions of the force.142 Moreover, 
mandates should provide the necessary resources for a mission. Though mandate 
provides the legitimacy for an intervention through the expression of political will of the 
international community, a mission not supplied with adequate resources creates a gap 
where failure is likely.143 
4. Causal Mechanisms of Peacekeeping 
Established principles of peacekeeping reveal a crucial contradiction: 
peacekeeping works where there is a peace to be kept. The consent of parties is the most 
critical requirement for peacekeeping. Although peace is strictly subject to the consent of 
the parties first by allowing troops to deploy and operate and then by appreciating and 
complying with the peace process, this requirement does not alleviate the need for the 
peacekeepers. The presence of peacekeepers creates the necessary environment for 
establishing and sustaining peace by raising costs and benefits, providing information to 
overcome security dilemmas, preventing escalation of accidents, and deterring attempts 
of political exclusion. First, deployment of troops in the area increases the cost of war, 
since the aggressor should risk confronting with international community. Although a 
peace enforcement mission provides military capability for peacekeepers to directly 
intervene to aggressions, a traditional mission also can deter aggression by serving as a 
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trip wire for a further enforcement mission thereby persuading parties for compliance. In 
addition to raising costs, peacekeepers can raise the benefits of peace as well by 
providing disputants international recognition and legitimacy, aid, and direct economic 
opportunities for individuals.144 Second, peacekeeping operation provides information to 
overcome security dilemma and provides communication between parties. As belligerents 
in a civil war may not have capabilities to monitor each other or even their own actions, 
peacekeepers can provide this required information by informing each side about the 
compliance of others and encouraging them for compliance, and informing countries that 
contribute aid on the condition of peace about non-compliance. Furthermore, 
peacekeepers provide a communication environment, which is otherwise impossible 
because of the experienced atrocities of war, for negotiations. Also presence of a 
communication opportunity reveals the intention of the parties by their willingness or 
reluctance for negotiation.145 Third, peacekeepers prevent escalation of accidental 
defections by low-level, on the spot mediation and neutral policing.146 Also peacekeepers 
can eliminate actors opposing peace process by “shifting power base within groups.”147 
Finally, peacekeepers can prevent political exclusion of conflicting groups by replacing 
or training police force into a new less biased one and ensuring the homogenous 
representation of all sides in the new army. Also monitoring voter registration, 
campaigning, and polling can ensure all sides on a fair election.148 
5. Evaluating Peacekeeping: A Normative Explanation 
The most important aspects of a UN peacekeeping operation, which is in practice 
similar to any international military intervention, is its “United Nationsness”149 and 
multilateralism. Although from a strict interpretation of idea of sovereignty any external 
intervention is a breach of the sovereign rights of a state, authorization by Security 
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Council and multilateral participation, with the deliberate exclusion of the stakeholder 
actors or superpowers, legitimizes and justifies UN peacekeeping operation. Complex 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement missions are the result of an 
implicit alteration in the meaning of sovereignty and expansion in the scope of UN 
activity. Increased cooperation in Security Council at the end of Cold War gathered 
authority, will, and power to redefine the collective intervention.150 Security Council has 
the legal power for legitimizing or delegitimizing the use of force. In the context of civil 
conflict, however, intervention contradicts with two basic principles of the UN: sovereign 
equality of its members, and prohibition of intervention “in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”151 
Martha Finnemore traces back the construction of the new intervention norm. 
First, over time, the meaning of humanitarian has changed to include all humanity. As in 
the examples of 19th century interventions, though the expressed reason for intervention 
was humanitarian, the extent of the term was limited to the white Christians.152 However, 
with the abolition of slavery and slave trade and decolonization and self-determination, 
meaning of humanitarian universalized in time.153 Though the nonwhite non-Christians 
had always been human, Western identity and the norms that affect them changed to 
include all human beings in the humanitarian sense. Second, the UN has started to play 
an important role in the legitimization of intervention. Rather than humanitarian 
justifications, the Security Council’s authorizations began to be the source of 
legitimization.154 States intervening in another’s territory militarily, even there were 
dramatic humanitarian crisis, without the authorization of the UN have been condemned 
severely. For example, Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 was condemned by 
international community, and India did not claim humanitarian crisis as a justification of 
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intervention.155 Finally, interventions must be multilateral to be legitimate. However, 
unlike the multilateralism of 19th century intervention, which was a strategic 
multilateralism of states to keep an eye on each other, recent interventions are according 
to the generalized principles of international responsibility and the use of military force. 
Most importantly, intervention forces should be under the UN command; operate under 
joint planning, rather than separate national commands; and be composed of disinterested 
states, preferably not great powers.156 
Reflecting Finnemore’s theoretical explanation for the normative evolution of 
military intervention, the UN and its member states recognized the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) approach. Written in 2000 by an International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty backed by Canadian government, R2P re-defines the states’ 
sovereignty as a responsibility to protect their population, rather than being solely the 
monopoly of use of physical force. In 2005 World Summit, international community 
recognized the idea of R2P as “(1) responsibility of the state to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and from their 
incitement; (2) the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting 
these obligations; and (3) the responsibility of the member states to respond in a timely 
manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.”157  Additionally, 
the Security Council adopted a resolution on the protection of civilians in 2006 to 
establish the foundations for a new normative and operational consensus of humanitarian 
intervention. The resolution was cited in the UN’s resolution in August 2007 to send a 
peacekeeping mission to Darfur.158 
D. CONCLUSION 
UN is the result of a continuous effort to prevent war and increase cooperation 
among the members of international community. Roots of current international system, 
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consisting of sovereign states, can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia. From that 
time onwards, states sought to overcome the anarchic self-help structure of the system. 
Until the creation of the League of Nations, states employed balance of power strategy—
ad hoc alliances of states against a potential aggressor—as the main tool to ensure their 
security and survival. However, increased interconnectedness and interdependence of the 
system and unprecedented destructiveness of the new warfare introduced after 
industrialization pushed states to seek for a more effective tool to sustain global peace 
after World War I. The League of Nations introduced the collective security system that 
accepts the indivisibility of peace and requires all members of the system to react any 
aggression even within the system. The League had many deficiencies to materialize the 
provisions of the collective security. Difficulty in decision-making process and loose 
regulations to ensure the commitment to the League’s sanctions eroded the legitimacy of 
the organization and failed to prevent the World War II. UN was established over the 
experiences of League failure and in the aftermath of the World War II. Founders of the 
UN aimed to overcome the shortcomings of the League experience and establish a more 
stable collective security system. Veto power was designed to keep the major powers in 
the system by assuring them a collective action would not be directed against them. 
Unfortunately, UN’s collective security was overshadowed by the Cold War tensions in 
the Security Council. Superpower struggle in the Security Council, empowered by the 
veto right, crippled the collective action provisions of the UN Charter. Finally, UN 
improvised peacekeeping as an impartial tool to restore peace.  
Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter as a way conflict resolution. 
Legally peacekeeping is between the Chapter VI, pacific settlement of disputes, and 
Chapter VII, enforcement measure to threats to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression. Thus, peacekeeping was called Chapter Six and a Half. 
Since there was not an established peacekeeping structure and guiding principles, 
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III. ASSESSING THE UN’S INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
This chapter will analyze the institutional capacity of the UN peacekeeping 
system to control and monitor PMSCs. Although PMSCs raise many questions about 
their accountability, civil-military relations theory claims that proper usage of PMSCs 
requires institutional power of the contracting agent. Thomas Bruneau’s offers a three-
dimensional civil-military relations framework to measure the institutional power to 
control PMSCs. To assess the institutional capacity of the UN peacekeeping system, the 
first section will shortly review the peacekeeping reforms in a historical perspective. 
Faced with the challenges of civil wars during 1990s, the UN started to question its 
peacekeeping structure and capabilities along with the efforts to define peacekeeping and 
its limitations. Since each conflict has its own aspects and challenges to be met, reform 
and review has provided an institutional learning process to the UN and has been a 
continuous task. As peacekeeping was an unforeseen function in the UN Charter and 
there was not a specially designed organizational structure for peacekeeping, the common 
goal of each reform has been defining peacekeeping and developing institutional 
capabilities. However, since the UN is a highly political organization, any structural or 
functional change of the international organization requires long debates and political 
compromises. Thus, a substantial change and improvement has been occurred in the 
peacekeeping system. 
The second section will apply Bruneau’s civil-military relations framework to the 
UN peacekeeping system. Emphasizing the power of institutions, rather than individuals 
or just written procedures, Bruneau points out institutional mechanisms to properly 
employ PMSCs. His framework expands control requirement of classical civil-military 
relations theory to include effectiveness and efficiency. Although civilian control of 
security agencies is the basic requirement of civil-military relations, Bruneau points out 
to the need to measure how well and at what cost they do their jobs. Adding effectiveness 
and efficiency is especially important for the UN system since peacekeeping is dependent 
on scarce resources. Moreover, effective implementation of the mandated peacekeeping 
operations will increase the resources contributed by the member states. 
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A. REFORMING UN PEACEKEEPING 
1. An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
Although the UN’s official record starts UN peacekeeping reform efforts with the 
Brahimi report, which is a comprehensive overview of peacekeeping policies and 
structure and led to substantial reform implementation, first attempt to strengthening UN 
peacekeeping system was Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping report issued on June 17, 
1992. The report had been requested at the Security Council meeting first-ever held at the 
head of state level.159 An Agenda for Peace situated peacekeeping on a continuum that 
included conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peace building. The 
secretary-general outlined five roles that United Nations would play in conflict 
prevention and resolution: 
(1) Preventive diplomacy involves confidence-building measures, fact-finding, 
early warning, and possibly preventive deployment of forces, to prevent disputes from 
arising, to prevent escalation of disputes, and to limit the spread of conflicts when they 
occur, 
(2) Peace enforcement is the authorization of heavily armed national forces 
operating under the direction of Secretary-General to ensure compliance with a cease-fire 
mandated by the Security Council, 
(3) Peace making aims to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful 
means,  
(4) Peacekeeping is the deployment of UN troops with the consent of the parties 
to monitor a truce as a confidence-building measure. 
(5) Postconflict peacebuilding includes developing the social, political, and 
economic infrastructure to establish the basis for a long-lasted peace.160 
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On peacekeeping, Secretary-General emphasized the basic conditions for success 
as “a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that 
mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States 
to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; 
effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate 
financial and logistic support.”161 Although report was welcomed by the member states 
in the intention of strengthening UN peacekeeping, the response was limited to the 
recommendations of the report. Ambitious proposal of establishing peace enforcement 
units did not materialize since member states were reluctant to hand over the control of 
their armed forces to the UN. Although many General Assembly resolutions were 
adopted recognizing the calls of the report for strengthening peacekeeping system to deter 
aggressors of peace, none of the resolutions mention the establishment of peace 
enforcement units.162 
Boutros-Ghali issued two other reports. An Agenda for Development (1994) 
accentuated peacebuilding efforts as a fundamental component of peace process by 
establishing new social, political, and judicial institutions that could start and sustain 
development. Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (1995) was a self-critique, however, 
again failed to bring a new look into peacekeeping.163 
Despite their focus on robust peacekeeping capacities, An Agenda for Peace and 
Boutros-Ghali’s other reports did not mention the question of protection of civilians. 
Along with the failed proposal of enforcement units, unsuccessful peacekeeping 
experiences of 1990s, particularly Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia, revealed the 
shortcomings of the policy framework offered in An Agenda for Peace and following 
reports. Srebrenica massacre, mass killings of civilians under the UN protection, and 
Rwandan genocide, killing of five hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus as UN 
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failed to respond to the conflict, proved that traditional peacekeeping has to be reviewed 
and revived to counter the challenges of civil-conflicts. 
2. Brahimi Report (2000) 
The most comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping system has been the Report 
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation known as the “Brahimi Report” after the 
Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi issued in August 2000. 
Report was built on two previous reports that reviewed the catastrophic events of 
Srebrenica and Rwanda—The Fall of Srebrenica published in November 1997 and The 
Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda.164  
Since peacekeeping is the most significant resource consuming function of UN 
system and depended on the voluntary contributions of member states and failures may 
destroy its legitimacy, panel focused particularly on peacekeeping. Issues addressed by 
the report included key elements of peacekeeping such as clarity of mandates and 
communication between UN officials, states and staff; planning, logistics, and mission 
leadership; rapid deployment of troops, police, and civilian personnel; and issues related 
to human rights and rule of law. However, there are criticism that report failed to address 
certain question such as training, HIV/AIDS, medical care in the field, gender-related 
issues, security of UN field personnel, and the definition of exit strategy.165 Although the 
Security Council welcomed the report, General Assembly remained reserved about robust 
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Report comprehensively reviews the UN peacekeeping system on the issues of (1) 
doctrine and strategy, (2) institutional capacity for anticipating, planning, and managing 
operations, and (3) rapid and effective deployment. Following is a short summary of 
report’s recommendations and steps taken accordingly. 
a. Issues of Doctrine and Strategy 
(1) The Need for Preventive Action and a Peacebuilding 
Strategy. The report called for greater use of fact-finding missions in areas of tensions. 
Although there are funding problems, both Security Council and Secretary-General has 
recognized this call and increased the use of fact-finding missions. Report also urged for 
a better-integrated peacebuilding strategy; however, the resulting peacebuilding Plan of 
Action could not go beyond general guidelines, and the need for better strategy 
remains.167 
(2) The Need for Clear, Credible, and Achievable Mandates. 
According to the report’s recommendations, Security Council increased its consultations 
with troops contributing countries when drafting or changing mandates; however, the 
Security Council did not establish a standing subsidiary body for troop contributing 
consultations. Secretariat took recommendation of the report for active involvement in 
mandate process and began to tell the Security Council about the limits of the 
peacekeeping capacity of organization. For example, Secretariat declined to take a 
military role in Afghanistan.168 
(3) Requirements for Effective Peacekeeping in Complex 
Operations. Report called for the recognition of the need for use of force in situations 
other than self-defense. This is especially important in case of protecting civilians. 
Mandates for missions in DRC and Liberia met this requirement and allowed 
peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians.169 
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(4) Requirements for Effective Peacebuilding in Complex 
Operations. To provide credibility to the UN operation and improve the local conditions, 
report recommended Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Moreover, funding for Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is recommended to support peacebuilding 
projects. Funding for QIPS and DDR are added to mission budgets to meet the 
recommendation of the report. Finally, Brahimi report recommended a comprehensive 
approach on rule of law including, in addition to the civilian police units, judicial, legal, 
and human rights expert. Though steps were taken to create a rule of law framework, 
enough staffing was not provided for this recommendation.170 
b. Capacity For Anticipating, Planning, And Managing Operations 
(1)  Strategic Analysis and Knowledge. To increase the 
institutional learning and information management capacities, Brahimi report 
recommended establishing an ECPS-based information and strategic analysis staff 
(EISAS). However, member states opposed the recommendation and provided Secretariat 
only a small support.171 
(2) Integrated Mission Task Forces. Report recommended 
establishing Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to better coordinate the efforts of 
all UN bodies participating in peacekeeping operations. Although IMTFs have been 
created since 2000 to improve horizontal coordination, they have not had decision 
authority. Peacekeeping system planning still works through single decision-making 
chain.172 
(3) Rebuilding the Secretariat. Report addressed the issue of 
understaffing of peacekeeping related bodies. DPKO received new posts according to the 
report’s suggestions. However, DPA still suffers understaffing.173 
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c. Rapid and Effective Deployment 
(1) Defining Deployment Benchmarks: The Secretary-General 
and member states agreed on recognizing the Brahimi reports rapid deployment 
benchmarks as a UN definition. Report recommended deployment of a traditional 
peacekeeping mission within thirty days and a complex operation within ninety days of 
receiving the mandate.174 
(2) Advance Planning and Spending Authority: The Brahimi 
report recommended that mandates be written according to the troops contributed to the 
operation. The Security Council offered planning mandates instead to allow the 
Secretary-General to garner the troop contributions.175 
(3) Improving Mission Leadership: The report recommended 
measures to improve mission leadership. However, continued employment of political 
candidates fails to recognize the emphasis of the report on managerial talent and 
experience as qualifications for mission leadership.176 
(4) Recruiting and Deploying Capable Military Forces: To 
meet the requirements of rapid deployment, reports urged for better use of UN Stand-by 
Arrangements System (UNSAS), the voluntary roster of member states’ contribution for 
peace operations. UNSAS was reorganized and now includes four levels of commitment, 
including a new Rapid Deployment Level to meet deployment benchmark of thirty and 
ninety days.177 
 
(5) Recruiting and Deploying Capable Police and Other 
Criminal Justice Personnel: Although the panel urged for developing on-call lists of 
civilian police and other rule of law elements, member states have not committed such 
lists.178 
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(6) Recruiting and Deploying Capable Civilian Field Staff: 
Secretariat has put job applications online to attract a wider range of applicants. Measures 
were taken to improve the conditions and incentives of civilian staff such as offering 
training opportunities.179 
(7) Logistics Support for Rapid Deployment. To reduce 
problems of providing equipment to operations, the Secretariat created ready-to-go 
Strategic Deployment Stocks to be maintained at a UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, 
Italy.180 
3. Establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 
In preparation for 2005 World Summit, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed 
a High-Level Panel to review and assess current threats to international peace. Report of 
the panel provides a comprehensive account of factors that fuel civil wars and threatens 
regional and international stability. On the issue of peacekeeping, report emphasized the 
need to increase operational capacities to meet the challenges posed by diminishing 
resources committed to peacekeeping.181 Report recommended establishing a 
Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office. Peacebuilding 
Commission was offered to strengthen UN’s capacity for peacebuilding by providing 
coherency and effectiveness in peacebuilding efforts. Report recommended a 
Peacebuilding Support office in Secretariat to support Commission to integrate system-
wide peacebuilding policies.182 Secretary-General recognized the recommendations of 
the Panel in his March 2005 report In Larger Freedom and offered member states 
establishing an inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding 
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Support office in the Secretariat to “strengthen collective capacity to employ the tools of 
mediation, sanctions and peacekeeping.”183 
As an outcome of 2005 World Summit, the Peacebuilding Commission was 
established along with a multi-year standing fund and a small peacebuilding support 
office in the Secretariat. Peacebuilding commission was established to facilitate joint 
planning across the UN system. Main purposes of the Commission are: 
(a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and 
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; 
(b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts 
necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated 
strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; 
(c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of 
all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to 
help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period 
of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.184  
Commission consists of two bodies (1) the Organizational Committee and (2) 
country-specific meetings. The Organizational Committee consists of members of the 
Security Council (including all permanent members), members of the Economic and 
Social Council, top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to the United 
Nations, top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions and seven 
additional members. All Organizational Committee members are invited to participate in 
the country-specific meetings, in addition to the country under consideration, countries in 
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the region who participate in the post-conflict process, the senior UN field representatives 
in the field, and major contributors of finance, troops and civilian police.185 
4. Restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
2007 
With the almost 50 percent growth in peacekeeping operations in 2000s, DPKO’s 
capacities were stretched thin in particular within the Office of Operations. To meet the 
increase in the number and complexity of operations, incoming Secretary- General Ban 
Ki-moon made DPKO reform a priority. However, his first call for the re-structuring of 
the department and the establishment of a separate Department of Field Support (DFS) 
was rejected by the General Assembly in February 2007. Members from the Group of 77 
contended that such reform had to proceed according to the established legislative 
procedures of the Organization. A resolution was adopted in March 2007 and after the 
General Assembly’s 5th Committee adopted the budget, a new peacekeeping structure 
has become effective in July 1, 2007. In the new structure, DPKO focuses on operations, 
whereas the newly created DFS handles management and logistics. However, the General 
Assembly rejected the Secretary-General’s proposal to give DFS the authority over 
procurement for peacekeeping operations, which will remain within another body, the 
Department of Management. Although the SG had initially called for 400 new posts, 284 
newly created positions were added to the structure. 
5. Capstone Doctrine (2008) 
Articulating the principles and guidelines of peacekeeping operations, 
DPKO/DFS published a capstone doctrine in 2008 to be the highest guiding document of 
peacekeeping doctrine. Though parallel with the Brahimi report, Capstone addresses the 
issue of principles of peacekeeping more broadly reserving an entire chapter to them. In 
addition to the traditional principles, Capstone adds other success factors: legitimacy, 
credibility and promotion of national and local ownership.186  
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6. New Horizon (2009) 
New Horizon—the latest reform program initiated to address the problems of 
peacekeeping—started in 2009. New Horizon is designed as a process to (1) assess the 
current and future policy and strategy dilemmas of peacekeeping and (2) improve the 
dialogue between the stakeholders in peacekeeping.187 
B. ASSESSING THE UN’S INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO EMPLOY 
PMSCS 
This section evaluates the institutional capacity of the UN peacekeeping system 
according to Thomas Bruneau’s three dimensional civil-military relations theory. 
Bruneau’s framework includes control, effectiveness, and efficiency dimensions. Control 
dimension requires institutional mechanisms to assert control and authority over military 
assets. Although peacekeeping operations are executed under the legal authority of the 
Secretary-General given by the Security Council, due to the political challenges of peace 
process, this authority remains as a loose coordination function to enhance cooperation 
among the several participants of peacekeeping operations. Effectiveness dimension 
requires an operational doctrine to provide a common understanding of missions, an 
overarching institutional agency to provide coordination, and providing required 
resources to implement the assigned missions. Though the UN has developed a 
peacekeeping doctrine based on the past experiences, current document mostly deals with 
macro issues of peacekeeping and far from providing guidance on the field. Additionally, 
since peacekeeping operations involve several UN or non-UN actors, there is a crucial 
need for a coordination mechanism, which has been emphasized in reform proposals. 
However, the attempts to create an institution responsible for the coordination of overall 
activities in peacekeeping operations have either increased the complexity of 
peacekeeping system or remain consultative without a formal authority. Integrated 
Mission Task Forces and the Peacebuilding Commission have been major attempts to 
increase coordination in peacekeeping. Finally, although the UN has increased its 
logistical capacity to provide resources to operations, the main focus of the UN’s logistics 
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system is to enable rapid deployment of a mission and is still dependent on the member 
states on major equipment. The third dimension of the framework is efficiency to 
determine at what cost the armed forces do their assignments. This is the most 
problematic issue in peacekeeping. Since it is hard to define a timeframe or benchmarks 
in achieving peace, determining efficiency in peacekeeping operations is difficult. Thus, 
engaging a profit-seeking actor in peacekeeping operations, where there is not a clear end 
time, would not be cost-effective solution. Overall, if the UN would employ PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations without meeting the requirements of control, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, PMSCs would not provide better solutions than the national troops. 
1. Control 
The UN peacekeeping system has a straightforward chain of command; however, 
there are problems in throughout the chain that hampers an effective control. The highest 
degree of authority belongs to the Security Council. UN Charter designates the Security 
Council responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Peacekeeping operations are deployed after the Security Council issues a mandate that, in 
addition to providing basic legitimacy to the operation, defines the scope of the operation, 
goals to be met, and the limits. Thus, the Security Council provides legal authority, high-
level strategic direction and political guidance for peacekeeping operation. The Security 
Council vests the operational authority of operations in the Secretary-General. Under 
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO) has the responsibility for 
the administration and direction of all peacekeeping missions (including both civilian and 
military personnel) in the name of Secretary-General. In the field, generally a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has the overall authority over the 
operation as the senior UN representative.188 
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a. Security Council 
Most important problem in the control dimension is the gap between the 
Security Council mandates and the field operations. Although the mandates provide the 
legitimacy and reflect the political will of the international community on resolving a 
conflict, the field operations may suffer from the absence of the means to implement the 
mandates. Since the Security Council is a heterogeneous political body, mandates are 
mostly result of a considerable political compromise, which may fail to provide the 
necessary means to the field to implement missions. Civilian leaders are not aware of the 
military tools in their disposal and may authorize more than the troops on the field can 
achieve. This situation creates a “fantastic gap”189 between the grand strategic level and 
the field level of peacekeeping system. Most dramatic example of this situation is the safe 
haven policy imposed by the Security Council in Bosnia. The Security Council created 
safe areas in Bosnia to stop Serbian attacks on civilians to alleviate the public outrage. 
Troops on the ground were neither mandated to defend these areas nor have the necessary 
force to do so. Additionally, all of the safe areas were enclaves within the Serbian 
territory and dependent to Serbian compromise for transportation. Thus, this policy only 
helped Serbian forces to do their job easier.190 
The most important reason for this gap is the absence of sufficient military 
advice during drafting a mandate. The Brahimi report recommended the participation of 
the Secretariat and the troop contributing countries to mandate process. The Security-
Council recognized the idea and incorporated Secretariat’s contribution into draft 
process. In current situation, the Security asks the Secretary-General for advice whether a 
peacekeeping operation should be deployed and what it should be mandated to do.191 
However, Secretary-General’s advice provides only the political portrait of the situation: 
whether it threatens international peace, a cease-fire exists, or parties consent to the 
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operation. Moreover, other recommendation of the Brahimi report to take the advice of 
participating countries is still lacking. UN peacekeeping operations rely on the funds, 
troops, and police contributed by member states. Therefore, they must be involved in the 
planning process. 
A better solution for providing sufficient military advice could be 
revitalizing Military Staff Committee (MSC), which is the only subsidiary body 
specifically named in the UN Charter. Article 47 of UN Charter establishes a Military 
Staff Committee “to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the 
Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament.”192 Although MSC, made up of the Chiefs of 
Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, began its meeting in 1946 and 
provided some reports on disarmament initially with agreement among its members, by 
August 1948 a deadlock was declared as the Cold War really set in.193 MSC could 
provide the Security Council the crucial military advice needed when drafting a mandate. 
However, MSC should be reorganized to include representation from all Security Council 
members.194 In addition to the advice in mandate process, MSC can provide a global 
licensing system for PMSCs to oversee overall activities and ensure compliance with 
international law and human rights.195 
b. DPKO/DFS 
Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations is in the day-to-day 
command of all peacekeeping operations, but the institutional capacity of UN 
headquarters is inadequate to provide a strict military command and control. Since 
peacekeeping was not a concept mentioned in the UN Charter, institutional capacity 
within the headquarters grew in time as a response to the necessities of peacekeeping 
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operation. Although most appropriate Charter body to command peacekeeping was MSC, 
Cold War tensions locked this opportunity. Until 1992, peacekeeping operations were 
managed by Office for Special Political Affairs. However, with the post-Cold War surge 
in peacekeeping operations, office began to lose its control over the field. In 1992, 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali restructured the peacekeeping system by 
separating all political offices into the new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and 
turning old office into Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) responsible for 
operational business. The last change in the UN peacekeeping structure was the creation 
of Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. DFS 
is responsible for providing “support in areas of finance, logistics, Information 
Communication and Technology (ICT), human resources, and general administration.”196 
Despite UN has been continuously adapting to the challenges of 
administrating several peacekeeping operations including hundreds of thousands of 
personnel all around the world, there are several flaws of the system. First, peacekeeping 
structure has suffered from under-staffing. During 1990s, DPKO was supported by 130 
gratis military personnel—with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other 
operational specialties—loaned by member states free of charge to the UN. However, 
with the decline in operations at the end of 1990s, the General Assembly ordered an end 
to the use of gratis personnel. Departure of gratis officers depleted the support capacity 
and institutional memory of DPKO.197 Since 1999, DPKO has struggled with UN 
procedures to increase its personnel. In December 1999, the General Assembly approved 
67 new posts. After Brahimi Report, DPKO gained an increase of 191 personnel by 
2003.198 Last personnel increase came after the creation of DFS with 284 new posts.199 
Despite the weak headquarters capacity, DPKO currently leads 15 peacekeeping 
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operations and one political mission around the world including 112,840 personnel.200 In 
addition to the number of personnel, complex peacekeeping operations include several 
functions—protecting civilians, DDR, establishing or strengthening rule of law, training 
security forces, facilitating peace process, organizing elections—requiring different types 
of strategic guidance and resources.  
Second, UN has had problems to identify and recruit specialized civilian 
staff. To overcome this problem, UN developed an Internet-based system called Galaxy 
that automated staff recruitment procedures, including job profiles, vacancy 
announcements, applications and selection. Additionally, to increase retention rates of 
qualified personnel DPKO has implemented programs providing career advice to staff in 
the field; offering career support workshops, training and online learning modules; 
providing information on a broad range of career issues; and creating career resource 
centers in the field.201 Finally, last reform of splitting DPKO into two increased the 
coordination problems. Though creation of DFS aimed to increase the headquarters 
capacities to manage peacekeeping operation more effectively, new structure poses new 
coordination problems. A new support department out of the control of DPKO adds 
another level of coordination need and challenges the unity of command principle. 
Moreover, DFS is headed by an Under Secretary-General, a position equal to the USG 
DPKO in UN hierarchy. This equality may create a bureaucratic fight increasing the 
problems of coordination. 
c. Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
The highest UN authority in the field is the Special representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG). SRSG is not only responsible for peacekeeping or political 
mission, but also for the wider UN effort.202 Although this definition reminds a military-
like command, the diversity of the range of functions weakens the potential power of 
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SRSG. Thus, the real role of SRSG is to facilitate a process that generates and maintains 
coherence among the myriad of actors involved in peacekeeping.203 Complex 
peacekeeping operations include political, security, development, human rights, and 
humanitarian functions. SRSG acts as a facilitator to achieve coherence in this diverse 
environment with many actors executing different or overlapping functions.204  
Most important problem is that SRSG has no direct authority, other than 
the power of persuasion and the expectation of conformity. SRSG does not have the 
authority to hire or fire, nor has the ultimate control over mission’s resources. SRSG’s 
authority over almost all issues is subject to negotiation, contrary to a military command 
structure. SRSG’s authority is especially questionable in the relations with the 
headquarters, which control the resources.205 However, SRSG represents the will of the 
international community as expressed by the UN Security Council. This tacit authority 
and the active political support expressed by the international community provide the 
SRSG with political capital. Thus, SRSG is not powerless.206 
However, there is a need to strengthen the role of SRSG. First, personality 
of SRSG is a key factor for implementing authority in the broad context of complex 
peacekeeping.207 Thus, Secretariat should be selective in assigning SRSGs with higher 
managerial skills as well as political background. Second, SRSGs should have direct 
control over the resources and have funds at their direct disposal. SRSGs need material 
power to exert authority. 
2. Effectiveness 
In UN peacekeeping operations, effective implementation of peacekeeping 
operations has more important impacts on both peace and UN itself. First and most 
obviously, ineffective peacekeeping operations would not serve as a tool to restore peace 
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in conflict areas, and protracted conflicts have the potential of spilling over and threaten 
the international peace. Second, UN’s legitimacy as a peacekeeper and as a collective 
security apparatus is dependent on the success of peacekeeping operations. Although UN 
is an effective international organization in a wide range of peace related international 
issues, it is still an organization existing over the political will of its members. After all, 
as an organization dedicated to peace, the UN’s legitimacy stands over its functionality in 
serving as a peacekeeper—not only in peace operations but also in overall UN activities. 
Effectiveness dimension of proper civil-military relations have crucial 
requirements to ensure the effective implementation of tasks assigned to the security 
forces. First, a doctrine is needed to codify general principles that reflect the institutional 
insight on a particular issue. Doctrine guides all elements of the system, though executing 
different tasks, in the same direction to achieve a shared goal and prevents redundant 
efforts, duplications, and misconduct. Second, coordination among the several agencies 
involved in a system should be based on an institutional structure. Although doctrine 
provides a common understanding, an institutional capacity is needed to ensure 
compliance with the doctrine. A well-written doctrine does not guarantee an institutional 
effectiveness without an overarching institution that oversees different activities of sub-
elements of the system. Finally, effectiveness requires resources to be provided to 
properly implement missions assigned to the security forces.  
a. Doctrine 
Establishing a doctrine that defines general principles of peacekeeping has 
been a main subject during efforts reforming UN peacekeeping system. The most recent 
and official document that defines the peacekeeping doctrine is United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) issued in 2008. 
However, since peacekeeping has been an ad hoc process, official UN reports were the 
primary documentary on peacekeeping during 1990s and early 2000s.208 An Agenda for 
Peace and the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace were the first efforts to define the 
peacekeeping and its principles. The main discussion of the Secretary-General Boutros-
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Ghali was the reinterpretation of the traditional concept of consent of all parties to the 
conflict. Agenda implied that consent was no longer an absolute requirement as it had 
been in traditional peacekeeping. However, challenges of the 1990s revealed that local 
actors could easily withdraw their consent to the UN presence and jeopardize the peace 
process. Thus, Supplement revived a more restrictive interpretation of consent principle 
and emphasized the need for consent of all parties. The Brahimi report also addressed the 
issues related to peacekeeping principles. The Brahimi report, while recognizing the 
importance of the local consent, argues that peacekeepers should be given the capacities 
to defend themselves and the mandate against potential spoilers. Moreover, report also 
questioned the principle of impartiality and separated it from absolute neutrality. Brahimi 
report suggested that peacekeepers should confront spoilers who act against the will of 
majority. Finally, the Brahimi report tackled the issue of protecting civilians suggesting 
that “peacekeepers—troops or police—who witness violence against civilians should be 
presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United 
Nations principles.”209 
Building on the past experiences, Capstone Doctrine adds more to the 
principles of peacekeeping by going into more detail; however, there are still flaws in the 
doctrine. First, Capstone clarifies the principle of consent of all parties. Consent of the 
main parties to the conflict is necessary to avoid UN peacekeeping being dragged into the 
conflict as an actor; on the other hand peacekeepers must have the skills (including the 
use of force) to confront a breakdown in local consent. However, as non-state actors in an 
intrastate conflict are often multi-faceted and complex, naming a spoiler still challenges 
the principle of consent. Second, on the principle of impartiality, Capstone illustrates 
peacekeeping in the image of a referee who is impartial but still penalizes infractions. 
Capstone emphasizes the need for transparency, openness, and effective communication 
as an effective way of implementing this kind of impartiality. However, openness does 
not necessarily bring acceptance. Most probably, openness will not change the perception 
of local population, who supports the specific faction confronted by UN peacekeeping. 
The most important contribution of the Capstone to the peacekeeping doctrine is 
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expanding the principle of non-use of force except in self-defense to the defense of the 
mandate as well. This expansion has many implications. Since mandates often include 
civilian protection, this expansion provides a basis to interpret use of force other than 
self-defense. Finally, Capstone expands principles by adding three other success factors: 
legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership. These ideas are not 
new, but Capstone codifies them for the first time. Legitimacy must be ensured both 
internationally (derived from a Security Council mandate) and locally (based on how the 
PKO conducts itself and shows respect to local culture). Credibility refers to a mission’s 
capability, effectiveness and ability to manage and meet expectations. Finally, the 
promotion of national and local ownership is a vital part of long-term peacebuilding, and 
necessary to ensure a self-sustained peace after the withdrawal of a UN peacekeeping 
operation.210 
These success factors are closely linked to the peacekeeping principles. 
“For example, a local spoiler might initially be reluctant to consent to a PKO until the 
threat of force is presented. However, this threat of force will only be taken seriously if 
the mission has sufficient capabilities to be seen as a “credible” force. Furthermore, the 
extent to which the PKO maintains high ethical conduct, and demonstrates respect for the 
culture and people it is protecting, will have a profound effect on whether the population 
views the mission as “legitimate,” and thus whether they pressure their political leaders to 
give their consent to the mission. This support then becomes a crucial component in the 
mission’s ability to promote local and national.”211 
Although Capstone defines the principles of peacekeeping in detail, there 
is still a gap in peacekeeping doctrine in addition to the conceptual controversies 
mentioned. Since Capstone Doctrine deals mostly macro level issues, it is questionable 
whether it can provide guidance on the field. Contrary to a military doctrine, which 
provides strategic guidance with tactical referrals as well, Capstone Doctrine mostly deals 
with macro aspects of peacekeeping.  
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b. Coordination 
Since most of the post-Cold War peacekeeping operations involved in 
civil conflicts where the states do not exist or cannot provide rule of law, most of the 
recent peacekeeping operations includes missions related to strengthening or creating 
state institutions. Peacekeeping operations require contribution of many UN or non-UN 
agencies each has different or, most of the time, overlapping goals. Involvement of many 
different agencies makes coordination a real challenge in peacekeeping operations. 
Throughout the dispersed UN entities, governance structures, administrative policies, 
business practices, human resource systems, evaluation standards, funding processes, 
procedures and organizational cultures varies. In addition to the main organs of the UN—
the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship 
Council, International Court of Justice and Secretariat—the UN system comprises of 16 
specialized agencies, 14 funds and programs, and 17 departments and offices.212 In the 
field, the UN peacekeeping operations include “Department of Peacekeeping Operations . 
. . the United Nations Development Programme . . . the Department of Political Affairs . . 
. and some 31 other agencies, funds and programmes. In addition . . . representatives of 
international community . . . include international financial institutions, regional 
organizations, individual UN Member States and coalitions, national development 
agencies, intergovernmental organizations outside UN structure and international non-
governmental organizations.”213 All entities that play a crucial role in peacekeeping 
report to their own governing bodies. These vertical coordination structures do not 
guarantee effectiveness and hamper the efficient use of resources. Reports that urged for 
reform in peacekeeping emphasized the need for increased coordination among the actors 
involved in peacekeeping operations. Though some steps have been taken to improve 
coordination, peacekeeping system still suffers from lack of coordination. Along with the 
recommendations of Brahimi report, Integrated Mission Task Forces were employed to 
bring all UN agencies together to increase coordination. Additionally, after 2005 World 
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Summit Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established to bring all relevant actors 
involved in peacekeeping operations to increase coherency and coordination. However, 
both IMTFs and PBC remain as advisory bodies without formal authority. 
(1) Integrated Mission Task Forces. The Brahimi report 
recommended that “Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from 
throughout the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help 
them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters 
provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the 
Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military 
operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian 
assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and 
recruitment.”214  
Following the recommendation of the Brahimi report, the first full-time 
IMTF was established in New York to improve coordination in planning a new mission 
among UN entities for the mission in Afghanistan, but the task force was prematurely 
disbanded well before the mission was fully deployed.215 However, the concept IMTFs 
has continued to develop in the post-Brahimi report period. These task forces were aimed 
to bring all relevant UN entities in the planning and coordination of a peacekeeping 
operation. Although these IMTFs have proven to be useful vehicles for sharing 
information and improving coordination, they have largely failed to provide integrated 
strategic planning and management. Despite the improvements in functioning of IMTFs 
since 2005, their record remains mixed.216 
(2) Peacebuilding Commission. The main goal of the 
establishment of Peacebuilding Commission was to create an overarching institutional 
body to achieve coordination in peacekeeping. However, the end result was not more 
than duplication of efforts by adding another entity to the system. There are several 
reasons for the failure of PBC in increasing coordination. First, PBC is a subsidiary body 
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of both the General Assembly and the Security Council as both organs have strong claims 
on international peace. However, this dual authority raises questions about reporting lines 
and implementation of PBCs recommendations. Additionally, PBC is only a consensus-
based advisory body without a formal authority depending on the quality of its 
recommendations, the relevance of information it shares, and its ability to generate 
resources. However, due to the lack of formal authority, it might be difficult to achieve 
coordination even when consensus is reached.217 
Moreover, PBC is bogged down in procedural matters because of 
wide membership of its main organs: the Organizational Committee and the country-
specific meetings. The Organizational Committee consists of members of the Security 
Council (including all permanent members), members of the Economic and Social 
Council, top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to the United Nations, top 
providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions and seven additional 
members. All Organizational Committee members are invited to participate in the 
country-specific meetings, in addition to the country under consideration; countries in the 
region participate in post-conflict process, senior UN field representative in the field, and 
major contributors of finance, troops and civilian police.218 The PBC Organizational 
Committee met for the first on 23 June 2005. However, due to the diverse and wide 
membership of the committee (committee had 31 members in 2007); first six months 
were preoccupied with procedural issues in a climate of suspicion.219 
Finally, there are concerns about PBC that it duplicates, confuses, 
and diverts scarce resources dedicated to international peace. Although country-specific 
meetings develop Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies to increase coherency by providing 
a holistic approach, almost all of the countries under post-war reconstruction already 
have home-grown strategies. For example, Sierra Leone, on which the second country-
specific meeting was held, already has a Poverty Reduction Strategy, a Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework, and a Peace Consolidation strategy. In addition to these 
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strategies, PBC country-specific meeting agreed on addressing four critical areas in Sierra 
Leone: youth empowerment and employment, consolidating democracy and good 
governance, justice and security reform, and capacity building.220 
c. Resources 
Providing required equipment quickly and in sufficient numbers along 
with support systems has been, and continues to be one of the biggest challenges facing 
UN. Although Brahimi report defined rapid deployment benchmarks as deployment of a 
traditional peacekeeping mission within thirty days and a complex operation within 
ninety days of receiving the mandate, these benchmarks rarely have been satisfied. Since 
peacekeeping operations are deployed in war torn countries, which can provide little or 
no capacity to provide basic services such as electricity, clean water, food, banking 
services, transportation etc., peacekeeping operations require huge organizational 
logistics capacity. UN has introduced several reforms and innovations to accelerate 
deployment times and improve logistics. However, despite numerous logistic capabilities, 
UN peacekeeping system is still dependent on the contribution of member states in major 
equipment and self-sustainment capabilities. 
Following is short analysis of development of UN’s logistic capacity to 
support peacekeeping operations: 
(1) Peacekeeping Reserve Stocks: In 1989, Peacekeeping 
Reserve Stocks were established to overcome the long time delays due to procurement 
process in deploying operations. Stocks aimed to improve the reaction time of 
peacekeeping operations and relieve delays by UN-owned equipment and supplies 
common to peacekeeping operation.221 
(2) Mission Start-up Kits: On 22 December 1995, the General 
Assembly approved the strategic reserve stock, later took the form of Mission Start-up 
Kits, to provide logistics to new peacekeeping operations. Each start-up kit would include 
the equipment needed to establish a 100-person mission for 100 days and be packed and 
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ready to deploy. The main goal of these kits was to reduce the lead times, some of which 
lasted as long as 27 weeks, before major equipment would reach the mission area. The 
first permanent logistic base to support peacekeeping operations was established at 
Brindisi Italy in 23 November 1993. The United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) is used 
to store the start-up kits and other provisions. The UNLB start-up kits are replenished 
with the budgets of new missions that received kits stored at Brindisi. Upon the closure of 
a peacekeeping operation, durable and non-disposable equipment are returned to the 
UNLB.222  
(3) Strategic Deployment Stocks: Although the Mission Start-
up Kit system worked well for smaller missions of mid to late-1990s, by the turn of the 
century UNLB was completely depleted of its resources without budgetary tools in place 
to replenish them. In 18 July 2002, the General Assembly approved the proposal of the 
Secretary-General to create strategic deployment stocks. To avoid stockpiling large 
quantities of equipment, Strategic Deployment Stocks were agreed to be established for 
only one complex mission, with the one-time cost of $146.2 million. With the Strategic 
Deployment Stocks system, UN would stock, at Brindisi, key pieces of equipment—
vehicles, communication and engineering equipment, accommodation and ablution 
units—for rapid deployment to new peacekeeping operations. The role of Brindisi was 
expanded to include maintenance, shipment, and inspection of reserve equipment. 
However, stocks were once again severely depleted by 2004.223  
(4) Predefined Modules and Service Packages: In 2010 Global 
Field Support Strategy, the secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon proposed to improve the 
speed, quality, and cost-effectiveness of deploying missions through the development of 
Pre-defined Modules and Service Packages. The General Assembly agreed to an initial 
phase of 200-person camp design, developed from existing stocks, including 
accommodations, a medical facility, a rapidly deployable security perimeter system, 
water treatment, and waste management and energy systems, along with on-call technical 
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support. At the same time, the composition of the strategic deployment stocks was agreed 
to be reviewed to ensure the modularization.224 
(5) Establishment of a Regional Service Centre at Entebbe: As 
a part of the 2010 Global Field Support strategy, a service hub was established in 
Entebbe, Uganda to provide centralized support to the four different peacekeeping 
missions. Regional Service Centre innovation aimed to improve efficiency by combining 
capacity, reducing infrastructure and staffing in individual missions, and optimizing the 
use of high-value assets. This concept is still under close review; however, developing 
other regional service hubs is under consideration.225 
(6) Contingent Owned Equipment System: Despite these 
innovations and developments in logistics support capacities, the UN peacekeeping 
system is still dependent on the member states on major equipment. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) agreement is established between the United Nations and the 
contributing country for every deployed unit. The MOU details the major equipment, 
self-sustainment services and personnel, which the contributing country will provide. UN 
provides fuel, water, accommodation and rations for contingents. Additionally, 
contingents make use of aviation, cargo, and passenger movement, and medical facilities 
provided by the UN. Although details are agreed in the MOU, troop or police 
contributing countries provide major equipment and self-sustainment capabilities 
including vehicles and generators.226 
3. Efficiency 
Efficiency is the third dimension of the institutional CMR framework and most 
difficult to assess for UN peacekeeping operations. Efficiency is the evaluation of at what 
cost security forces achieve their assigned missions. The most important requirement of 
efficiency is the statement of goals to achieve. Peacekeeping operations require certain 
indicators of success to determine a proper withdrawal time. Especially in today’s 
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complex peacekeeping missions, which are entangled with peacebuilding efforts, 
defining specific timeframes or certain events as an indicator of success and time to 
withdraw is challenging. Although improving rapid deployment capacities have been a 
major subject of reforms, the UN peacekeeping operations have experienced more 
challenges in withdrawals. Five of the thirteen peacekeeping operations launched during 
Cold War are still in place, and there is not a clear agenda to terminate these missions. 
The most convincing motive of privatizing peacekeeping is the efficient use of scarce 
resources dedicated to UN peacekeeping. However, engaging private businesses, which 
inherently seek to sustain their income and maximize profits, into peacekeeping 
operations, where defining a desired end state and a predictable withdrawal time is 
difficult, do not promise an efficient alternative to traditional national troops. 
Since the Security Council mandate authorizes the deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation or its withdrawal, the Capstone Doctrine accepts the completion of mandate 
provisions as the indicator of success. However, it recognizes the differences between a 
traditional and a complex peacekeeping operation. Since traditional peacekeeping 
involves in interstate conflicts, a mutually agreed conflict settlement can be an obvious 
indicator of success. However, traditional peacekeeping operations have the risk of 
lasting long since they do not involve in diplomatic efforts to facilitate conflict resolution 
process. On the other hand, Capstone Doctrine is hesitant on “determining whether a 
multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping deployed in the aftermath of a violent 
internal conflict has successfully completed its mandate is far more challenging given the 
number of complex variables involved.”227 Doctrine defines the goals of complex 
peacekeeping mission engaged in intrastate conflicts as (1) restoring State’s authority; (2) 
re-establishing rule of law and strengthening human rights; (3) fostering institutions of 
governance; and promoting socio-economic recovery.228  
Accepting the difficulty of applying to all situations, capstone offers some 
indicators of success towards the consolidation of peace after a civil war: 
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“(1) The absence of violent conflict and large-scale human rights abuses, and 
respect for women’s and minority rights; 
(2) Completion of the DDR of former combatants (male and female, adults and 
children) and progress in restoring or establishing responsible state institutions for 
security; 
(3) The ability of the national armed forces and the national police to provide 
security and maintain public order with civilian oversight and respect for human 
rights; 
(4) Progress towards the establishment of an independent and effective judiciary 
and corrections system; 
(5) The restoration of State authority and the resumption of basic services 
throughout the country; 
(6) The return or resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons with minimal 
internal disruption or conflict in the areas of return or resettlement; 
(7) The successful formation of legitimate political institutions following the 
holding of free and fair elections where women and men have equal rights to vote 
and seek political office.”229 
Each of the goals and benchmarks stated in the Capstone doctrine refers to an 
element of state building, which is hard to achieve and to determine whether it is 
achieved. Thus, doctrine warns about the optimistic progress assessments. Finally, 
despite the importance of the subject, doctrine devotes five pages to ending peacekeeping 
operations with a relatively vague language. This is especially important to show that the 
UN peacekeeping system has mostly improved capabilities to rapidly start and support 
operations, but does not have a clear agenda on ending them. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempted to shed light on the institutional infrastructure of the UN 
peacekeeping system and to assess its ability to employ PMSCs in peacekeeping 
operations. With growing demand on the UN involvement in conflicts, peacekeeping bills 
have grown dramatically exceeding the regular UN budgets most of the time. 
Additionally, unsuccessful peace operations risk the future of peacekeeping by affecting 
the voluntary contribution of the UN member states. As a growing sector following the 
end of Cold War, PMSCs are offered as a cost-effective solution to peacekeeping 
compared to the traditional national troops. However, because of the controversial 
aspects of PMSCs, any institution hiring them needs mechanisms to control and monitor 
them to ensure the proper operation and effectiveness. Most important problem related to 
PMSCs is the lack of national or international mechanisms to hold them accountable. 
To assess the UN’s institutional capacity to properly employ PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations, this thesis analyzed the UN peacekeeping system according to 
the Thomas Bruneau’s three-dimensional civil-military relations framework. Seeing the 
shortcoming of the classical CMR theory that focuses exclusively on the aspect of 
civilian control of security forces, Bruneau adds effectiveness and efficiency as essential 
requirements to measure how well the security forces do their job and at what cost. Based 
on the New Institutionalism, Bruneau’s theory emphasizes the importance of institutions 
rather than individuals. 
Chapter II was an historical analysis of the emergence and development of the 
UN peacekeeping. Analysis shows that peacekeeping is the result of a norm development 
process. Until the establishment of the League of Nations, balance of power—ad hoc 
alignment of states to counter specific adversaries—was the main tool for sovereign 
states to secure their survival. The League system provided the basis of a collective 
security system. Different from balance of power, collective security system recognizes 
peace as indivisible and any breaches of peace as an attack to all members of the system, 
even the attack comes from within its membership. However, the League failed to 
prevent World War II. The UN was also established as a collective security, though with 
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more robust mechanisms this time. Decision-making process was improved and the 
sanctions became binding to avoid the League’s legacy, which had done too late and too 
little. However, this time Cold War prevented the practice of the collective security. The 
veto power, which was designed to keep the superpowers in the system, crippled the 
Security Council and prevented the materialization of collective security provisions of the 
UN Charter. The notion of peacekeeping was introduced as an impartial tool to resolve 
conflicts and restore international peace. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN 
Charter. It is a midcourse between the Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes) and 
Chapter VII (forceful action against breaches of peace) provisions of the Charter. 
Beginning as the interposition of military forces between warring sides in interstate wars, 
the peacekeeping has evolved into complex operations that aim to end fighting, facilitate 
peace process, provide security, restore or strengthen governmental functions in civil 
conflicts. Since there was not a UN structure to execute peacekeeping function, the UN 
peacekeeping system has evolved parallel with the needs of the conflicts in which it was 
deployed. 
Chapter III analyzed and assessed the institutional infrastructure of the UN 
peacekeeping system. Beginning with the end of Cold War and the upsurge of civil 
conflicts, the UN has started to review and reform its peacekeeping system. The common 
focuses of the peacekeeping reforms have been strengthening UN’s organizational 
structure and create an institutional understanding of peacekeeping. The first call for 
reform was the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. 
Boutros-Ghali called for establishing enforcement units to strengthen the UN’s military 
capabilities to enforce peace. However, this recommendation was not accepted by 
member states. Boutros-Ghali continued for reforms in two other reports, but the results 
were limited. The Brahimi report was the most comprehensive review of the 
peacekeeping system. Report urged for reforms on defining a peacekeeping doctrine and 
strategy, increasing the UN’s planning capacities, and improving rapid and effective 
deployment capacities. Several reforms were implemented following the report. In 2005, 
Peacebuilding Commission was established to increase collective capacity of 
peacekeeping along with a Peacebuilding Support Office within the Secretariat. To ease 
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the operation of DPKO overloaded with increased and complicated missions, DPKO was 
divided into two and the Department of Field Support was established in 2007. In 2008, 
DPKO/DFS issued a Capstone Doctrine to provide general guidelines and principles of 
peacekeeping. New Horizon is the last reform attempt initiated in 2009, and is still in 
progress. 
The rest of the Chapter III analyzed the results of reforms and development of the 
UN peacekeeping system by applying Bruneau’s three-dimensional CMR framework: 
control, effectiveness, and efficiency. Though the UN has been a continuously learning 
organization and adapting its structure to the challenges of international peace and 
security, the capabilities it has developed do not meet the requirements of Bruneau’s 
CMR framework. First, the UN peacekeeping structure has many deficiencies in 
command and control, which is the basic requirement of democratic CMR. There is a 
huge gap between the strategic level decision-making and field operations. The Security 
Council, designated as the main UN organ responsible for the international security, 
mandates and authorizes any peacekeeping operation. However, the Security Council 
lacks the sufficient military advice to mandate achievable missions to the peacekeeping 
operations, and to provide required resources. Additionally, the UN headquarters 
organization for peacekeeping is overloaded and does not have the managerial capacities 
to command peacekeeping operations around the world. Finally, the highest UN authority 
in the field, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), does not have a 
strict command authority on the actors participating in peace operation. Rather, SRSGs 
facilitate coordination among the many elements of peacekeeping system. 
In effectiveness dimension, the UN lacks a detailed doctrine, an overarching 
institutional body for coordination, and resources required for peacekeeping operations. 
The Capstone doctrine, issued by DPKO/DFS in 2008, provides only a macro 
understanding for peacekeeping. It defines principles and planning process; however, it 
fails to provide operational guidance for peacekeepers. As another element of 
effectiveness, the UN peacekeeping operations do not have a coordinating body. First 
attempt to create an institutional coordination among peacekeeping actors was the 
Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs). However, IMTFs do not have authority to 
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participate decision-making process. The main goal of the international organization in 
the establishment of Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was also to provide coordination 
and coherency among the participants of peace operations. However, PBC also cannot go 
beyond an advisory agent and does not have formal authority over peace operations. 
Moreover, two main bodies of PBC (the Organizational Committee and country specific 
meetings) are bogged down with procedural issues due to wide range of membership. 
Finally, the UN logistics system, though developed in time to increase rapid deployment 
capacities, cannot provide all resources required to achieve missions. The UN 
peacekeeping system is still dependent on member states’ contribution on major 
equipment. 
The UN peacekeeping system lacks requirements of efficiency, the third 
dimension of Bruneau’s framework. The most important requirement of efficiency is the 
statement of end states. However, the most controversial issue in peacekeeping has been 
to end the operations. Five of the thirteen Cold War era peacekeeping operations persist 
to exist. Although the Capstone Doctrine offers example benchmarks to decide whether a 
peace operation has reached its goals, it also acknowledges the requirements of each 
conflict and need for determining specific benchmarks. 
Using the literature on PMSCs and CMR, analysis of the UN system reveals that 
the UN lacks the institutional mechanisms and infrastructure to control PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations. Although PMSCs are often presented as a cost-effective 
solution to growing peacekeeping expenditures, the UN cannot control PMSCs in 
peacekeeping operations without developing institutional capacities presented by the 
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